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Abstract
The central focus of this paper is a proposal for rebalancing protection of cultural property so
as to take into account preservation of the cultural as well as property aspects of cultural property.
Part I distinguishes between cultural and property aspects of cultural property and demonstrates
how both aspects are important to an appropriate resolution of cultural property issues. Objects
of cultural property cannot be stripped of their cultural significance. They are not merely items
of property any more than children are the property of divorcing parents. Recognition of cultural
significance is an integral part of determining the best means of protecting cultural property. This
Part considers the property orientation of the generally accepted definition of cultural property. In
addition, Part I considers subsidiary issues raised by the dichotomous nature of cultural property.
Part II describes the current international legal regime for protecting cultural property and demon-
strates the failure of this regime to give adequate consideration to the cultural aspect of cultural
property. Part III identifies two schools of thought concerning cultural property. The first school
of thought, usually identified as cultural internationalism, is primarily concerned with physical
preservation of objects.2 This school articulates concerns in terms of property law principles. The
arguments of acquisitive nations, 3 museums, collectors, and archaeologists, all of whom seek to
protect their holding of or access to cultural property for aesthetic, scholarly, educative, or merely
possessory purposes, generally belong to this school of thought. The property law principles they
espouse include rights of title, possession, conquest, repose, and bona fide purchase. The second
school of thought, usually termed cultural nationalism, is primarily concerned with the cultural
significance of cultural property.4 Its arguments are often framed in terms of principles of hu-
man rights law. The demand is for cultural dignity and cultural self-determination. Arguments
for repatriation of objects of cultural significance to source nations 6 or to peoples belong to this
school of thought. This paper asserts that the disputes between these schools of thought are really
disputes over which aspect of cultural property deserves greater legal protection. Although the
common ground between these two camps is concern for preservation of objects of cultural sig-
nificance, preservation means different things to different interests. Part IV proposes a new legal
regime founded on the common ground between these schools of thought. This Part suggests two
approaches to the problem of protection of cultural property working in tandem. The first is a
reaffirmation of the preeminence of human rights principles in resolving cultural property ques-
tions. The second approach, from the model of environmental protection, addresses the problem
by reflecting global concern. The proposal is for a program of transfers of funding and technology
to protect the “best interests” of cultural property for the benefit of interested groups, as well as the
world community. Part V presents an assessment of the effectiveness of the proposal in protecting
both the cultural and property aspects of cultural property and the likelihood that the regime will
be acceptable to the world community.
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The protection of cultural property is developing as a fun-
damental concern of international law. A growing network of
bilateral and multilateral treaties addresses the treatment of
cultural property during armed conflict, regulates its import
and export, and, most recently, governs its repatriation to
source countries and peoples. Individual nations have taken
measures to protect what they perceive to be their cultural pat-
rimony via state ownership laws and domestic import and ex-
port regulations. Indigenous peoples, ethnic and religious
groups and organizations, on their own account and through
PROTECTING CULTURAL PROPERTY
their national governments, are actively seeking repatriation of
objects of significance to their respective cultural identities.
Although these treaties, domestic laws, and efforts at repatria-
tion have as their goal protection of objects of cultural signifi-
cance, the legal regime these sources have produced treat such
objects primarily as property.
The central focus of this paper is a proposal for rebalanc-
ing protection of cultural property so as to take into account
preservation of the cultural as well as property aspects of cul-
tural property.' Part I distinguishes between cultural and
property aspects of cultural property and demonstrates how
both aspects are important to an appropriate resolution of cul-
tural property issues. Objects of cultural property cannot be
stripped of their cultural significance. They are not merely
items of property any more than children are the property of
divorcing parents. Recognition of cultural significance is an in-
tegral part of determining the best means of protecting cul-
tural property. This Part considers the property orientation of
the generally accepted definition of cultural property. In addi-
tion, Part I considers subsidiary issues raised by the dichoto-
mous nature of cultural property. Part II describes the current
international legal regime for protecting cultural property and
demonstrates the failure of this regime to give adequate con-
sideration to the cultural aspect of cultural property.
Part III identifies two schools of thought concerning cul-
tural property. The first school of thought, usually identified
as cultural internationalism, is primarily concerned with physi-
cal preservation of objects.2 This school articulates concerns
in terms of property law principles. The arguments of acquisi-
tive nations, 3 museums, collectors, and archaeologists, all of
whom seek to protect their holding of or access to cultural
property for aesthetic, scholarly, educative, or merely posses-
sory purposes, generally belong to this school of thought. The
property law principles they espouse include rights of title,
possession, conquest, repose, and bona fide purchase. The
1. The present paper will survey only the protection of cultural property since
1954.
2. See generally John H. Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80
AM. J. INT'L L. 831 (1986) (labelling and defining these two schools of thought).
3. "Acquisitive nations" are described in other texts as "purchasing nations,"
"economically-rich nations," or "capital-rich nations."
10351992-1993]
1036FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 16:1033
second school of thought, usually termed cultural nationalism,
is primarily concerned with the cultural significance of cultural
property. 4 Its arguments are often framed in terms of princi-
ples of human rights law. The demand is for cultural dignity
and cultural self-determination. Arguments for repatriation of
objects of cultural significance to source nations 6 or to peoples
belong to this school of thought. This paper asserts that the
disputes between these schools of thought are really disputes
over which aspect of cultural property deserves greater legal
protection. Although the common ground between these two
camps is concern for preservation of objects of cultural signifi-
cance, preservation means different things to different inter-
ests.
Part IV proposes a new legal regime founded on the com-
mon ground between these schools of thought. This Part sug-
gests two approaches to the problem of protection of cultural
property working in tandem. The first is a reaffirmation of the
preeminence of human rights principles in resolving cultural
property questions. The second approach, from the model of
environmental protection, addresses the problem by reflecting
global concern. The proposal is for a program of transfers of
funding and technology to protect the "best interests" of cul-
tural property for the benefit of interested groups, as well as
the world community. Part V presents an assessment of the
effectiveness of the proposal in protecting both the cultural
and property aspects of cultural property and the likelihood
that the regime will be acceptable to the world community.
4. See generally, Merryman, supra note 2.
5. See, e.g., Universal Declaration Of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 135, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). "Human rights" is an um-
brella term embracing all fundamental rights and freedoms. Id. Article 1 states that
"[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." Id. Subsequent
articles define specific rights. Id. Among these human rights is the right of self-
determination, which has political, economic, social, and cultural aspects. See, e.g.,
International Covenant On Economic, Social And Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., art. 1, at 165, U.N. Doc. A/6546
(1967); International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, 21st. Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., art. 1, at 169, U.N. Doc. A/6546 (1967).
6. "Source nations" are called "art-rich nations," "countries of origin," and "ar-
tifact-rich nations" in the extensive literature on cultural property. See Hugues De
Varine, The Rape and Plunder of Cultures: An Aspect of Deterioration of the Terms of Cultural
Trade Between Nations, 139 MUSEUM 152 (1983) reprinted in JOHN H. MERRYMAN AND
ALBERT E. ELSEN, 1 LAw ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 46, 49-50 (1987) [hereinafter
LEVA].
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I. THE NATURE OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
John Henry Merryman has rightly identified tensions in
the international community between acquisitive nations and
source nations over a range of issues concerning protection
and repatriation of cultural property. 7 Tension exists involv-
ing the dichotomous nature of cultural property. The tension
is played out in concerns over the proper definition of "cul-
tural property." Thus, the question regarding what cultural
property should be protected by domestic and international ef-
forts remains unanswered.
A. Two Aspects of Cultural Property
An item of cultural property is an object that is of cultural
significance. It therefore has two aspects. The first aspect is
the property aspect, which derives from the fact that cultural
property consists of tangible, movable objects.8 The implica-
tion of calling something property suggests that it can be
owned, or at least possessed and controlled. The second as-
pect is the cultural aspect, which derives from the cultural sig-
nificance of the object.9 Perhaps the most effective way to
7. See John H. Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1881, 1894 (1985) (acknowledging growing international tension).
As the pressure for repatriation grows, the necessity for a framework for
discussion of cultural property questions grows with it. Although there are
significant exceptions, the topic seems to evoke a tendency to oversimplify,
to reach for the facile solution. To some, perhaps, it is not worth the effort:
cultural property does not seem important enough to call for deliberate
consideration. Sentiment may so overpower others that they become impa-
tient with the argument. Third World/First World politics cloud the discus-
sion.
Id. (emphasis added).
8. See LEVA, supra note 6, at 46.
The primary phenomenon [of illicit trade in cultural property]-one that in
fact governs the others-is the emergence of the concept of cultural goods
or property. Paradoxically, it is only when goods have been divested of their
intrinsic purpose, losing their primary functional utility, that they are
termed cultural property, providing they are considered worthy to be pre-
served, admired, i.e. used for another, secondary function.
Id.; see BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1216 (6th ed. 1990), distinguishing between "corpo-
real personal property, which includes movable and tangible things, such as animals,
furniture, merchandise, etc." and "incorporeal personal property, which consists of
such rights as personal annuities, stocks, shares, patents, and copyrights." I refer to
the former definition here.
9. See, e.g., C. Franklin Sayre, Comment, Cultural Property Laws In India And Japan,
33 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 851, 857, n.25 (1986).
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demonstrate the two aspects of cultural property is to consider
an example of a specific item of cultural property.
The war gods of the Zuni people, a Native American tribe
of the southwestern United States, are carved wooden idols
usually two or three feet tall. These Ahayu:da (ah-ha-YOO-
dah), carved by the tribe's Bear clan, appear to be simple,
rather abstract faces. The objects are rare because the clan
only carves two per year. The commercial market for these
sculptures sets their value between U.S.$5,000 and
U.S.$10,000.10 These facts demonstrate the property aspect of
cultural property. The objects, tangible and movable, are de-
scribed in terms of shape, size, rarity, and commercial value.
The property aspect may be starkly shown by the fact that doc-
umentation dating back to the early 1800s. shows that anthro-
pologists, archaeologists, geologists, explorers, and other visi-
tors to the Zuni Pueblo near Santa Fe often took the war gods
from the Zuni's tribal shrines.'" Not everything that can be
stolen is necessarily property, but most likely these objects
were taken because they were valued as property. Thieves for-
eign to the culture that produced such objects could not un-
derstand, or at least did not respect, the cultural significance of
the items.
Considering only the property aspect of the Ahayu:da,
however, tells only part of the story. The cultural aspect of
cultural property is demonstrated in the cultural significance of
such items to the people who created them. The Ahayu:da
were placed in a shrine where their powers were invoked to
protect the tribe. Each Ahayu:da serves as guardian for the
tribe until relieved by a new one. The older ones must remain
in place, contributing their strength until they decay and re-
turn to the earth. The war gods are meant to be exposed to
the weather so that they can do their work as religious objects.
Disintegration under the force of the elements is necessary to
their function. Although they can exist as objects, as property,
when displayed in a museum, they cannot serve their cultural
purpose.' 2 Another part of the cultural aspect of these objects
10. Rebecca Clay, Who Owns Indian Artifacts?, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug.
28, 1990, at 12.
11. Id.
12. 136 CONG. REC. S 17,173-77 (Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
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is that they 'cannot be treated as property in the usual sense
because no individual can own them.' 3  The Zuni began re-
trieving the war gods from institutions and collectors in 1978.
The recent return of the carved figures has boosted tribal mo-
rale and a sense of cultural identity.' 4 This effect on the mo-
rale of the tribe flows from the cultural aspect of cultural prop-
erty. Cultural property is integral to the esteem that people
hold for themselves and their past.' 5 It is also integral to their
identity. ' 6
Cultural significance gives particular objects value to a cul-
ture or to a collector. Cultural property stripped of cultural
significance would be merely property, more or less beautiful
or rare and more or less valuable on the basis of that beauty or
rarity only. Defining cultural property without reference to its
culture is not only foolish, but dishonest. It attempts to
strengthen claims of ownership while denigrating the very
thing that gives an object some of its value to the holder.
Nonetheless, recognition of the cultural aspect of cultural
property has rarely been apparent in efforts to define or pro-
tect it.
13. Clay, supra note 10. Edmund Ladd, a Zuni who is curator of ethnology for
the Museum of Indian Arts and Culture in Santa Fe, stated that, "Nobody, not even a
Zuni, not even the war priest, the rain priest, or the tribal chairman, nobody has the
right to them individually.... No one can have clear title to them. So when they're
removed from the shrine, they're without a doubt stolen objects." Id.
14. Id.
15. Sayre, supra note 9, at 857 n.25. "Art reflects a nation's level of self-respect
and the way in which its people view themselves and their past. The cultural heritage of
a nation, as embodied in archaeological artifacts and ancient treasures (sometimes referred to
as a nation's 'patrimony'), stimulates tourism, encourages scholarship, and contributes
to the intellectual life of a nation. It is in the interest of every nation to preserve its
.patrimony' ...... Id. (emphasis in original).
16. GEORGES KoUMANTOS, in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRO-
TECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTEENTH COLLOQUY ON
EUROPEAN LAW 12 (1984) [hereinafter ILPCP]. Professor Koumantos states that
[t]he importance of cultural property for individuals, nations or the whole of
humanity does not need to be proved. It gives each person his intellectual
identity, irrespective of whether he is a creator or simply a user. Cultural
property in its entirety constitutes a huge heritage which determines our
awareness and inspires new bursts of creativity. Any reduction in this heri-
tage, built up over the centuries and constantly added to, means a loss. The
protection of cultural property is rightly considered to be everybody's duty.
10391992-1993]
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B. The Definition of Cultural Property
Perhaps the most widely accepted definition of cultural
property is found in Article 1 of the UNESCO Convention on
the Means of Prohibiting the Illicit Import, Export and Trans-
fer of Ownership of Cultural Property (the "UNESCO
1970"). 17 The first notable element of this definition is that it
consists of a list of categories of property.
The most notable element of the definition of cultural
property in UNESCO 1970, however, is that it leaves to the
individual states designation of specific items from the various
categories as cultural property.' 8 The states may restrict the
17. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Conven-
tion [hereinafter UNESCO] on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 4, 1970, 823
U.N.T.S. 231, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 289 (1971) [hereinafter UNESCO 1970]; see
SHARON A. WILLIAMS, THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROTECTION OF MOVABLE
CULTURAL PROPERTY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 224-29 (1978) (discussing UNESCO
1970); UNESCO, THE PROTECTION OF MOVABLE CULTURAL PROPERTY I (COLLECTION
DU PATRIMONIE CULTUREL MOBILIER): COMPENDIUM OF LEGISLATIVE TEXTS 357-64
(1984) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM] (discussing UNESCO 1970). Article I states:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "cultural property" means
property which, on religious or secular grounds, is specifically designated by
each State as being of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, liter-
ature, art or science and which belongs to the following categories:
(a) Rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and anatomy,
and objects of paleontological interest; (b) property relating to history,
including the history of science and technology and military and social his-
tory, to the life of national leaders, thinkers, scientists and artists and to
events of national importance; (c) products of archaeological excavations
(including regular and clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries;
(d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or archaeological sites
which have been dismembered; (e) antiquities more than one hundred
years old, such as inscriptions, coins and engraved seals; (f) objects of
ethnological interest; (g) property of artistic interest, such as:
(i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by hand on any sup-
port and in any material (excluding industrial designs and manufactured ar-
ticles decorated by hand); (ii) original works of statuary art and sculpture
in any material; (iii) original engravings, prints and lithographs;
(iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in any material; (h) rare
manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents and publications of spe-
cial interest (historical, artistic, scientific, literary, etc.) singly or in collec-
tions; (i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in collections;
(j) archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic archives;
(k) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and old musical
instruments."
UNESCO 1970, art. 1, 823 U.N.T.S. at 234-36, 10 I.L.M. at 289-90.
18. Id.
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definition. The United States, for example, has limited the
definition of protected cultural property in the 1983 Conven-
tion on Cultural Property Implementation Act ("CPIA").' 9
Under the U.S. definition, objects do not become cultural
property until they have been removed from or are threatened
with removal from their cultural context.2 °
Although UNESCO 1970 emphasizes the property aspect
of cultural property, its definition of cultural property is at
least partly in terms of cultural significance and cultural con-
text. Recognizing that cultural property can be defined only
partially by its age, provenance, category, or threat of pillage,
UNESCO 1970 defines cultural property as "property which,
on religious or secular grounds, is . . . of importance for ar-
chaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science.'2
The introduction of cultural significance into the defini-
tion of cultural property in UNESCO 1970 does not go far
19. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613 (1988). Under the Cultural Property Implementa-
tion Act [hereinafter CPIA] only the import of archaeological or ethnological materi-
als, in danger of being lost to pillage, is prohibited if, and when, the president agrees
to restrict import of such items pursuant to a formal request by a nation shown to
vigorously protect its own items of cultural importance. Id. § 2602. Archaeological
material must be: of cultural significance; at least 250 years old; and normally discov-
ered as a result of scientific excavation, clandestine or accidental digging, or explora-
tion on land or under water. Id. § 2601. Ethnological materials must be: the prod-
uct of a tribal or nonindustrial society; at least 50 years old; and, important to the
cultural heritage of a people because of its distinctive characteristics, comparative
rarity, or its contribution to the knowledge of the origins, development, or history of
the people. Id.; see USIA, CURBING ILLICIT TRADE IN CULTURAL PROPERTY: U.S.
ASSISTANCE UNDER THE CONVENTION ON CULTURAL PROPERTY IMPLEMENTATION ACT
1, 22 (1989) [hereinafter CURBING ILLICIT TRADE].
20. See LEVA, supra note 6, at 46. Hugues De Varine recognized a similar anom-
aly but on a larger scale.
The primary phenomenon [of illicit trade in cultural property]-one that in
fact governs the others-is the emergence of the concept of cultural goods
or property. Paradoxically, it is only when goods have been divested of their
intrinsic purpose, losing their primary functional utility, that they are
termed cultural property, providing they are considered worthy to be pre-
served, admired, i.e. used for another, secondary function.... This concept
of cultural property is closely linked with those of 'traditional values,' the
concern for continuity, the search for 'cultural roots.' It is this very combi-
nation that has given rise to most public and private collections, the listing
of monuments and the creation of learned historical societies. Moreover,
the very rarity of these vestiges of the past leads to their enhancement both
in intellectual terms ("what is rare is beautiful") and in economic terms
("what is rare--or scarce-is dear")."
Id.
21. See UNESCO 1970, supra note 17, art. 1, 823 U.N.T.S. at 246.
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enough because of the final element of the definition of inter-
est here. That element is the definition's preoccupation with
the relationship of nation-states to cultural property. Not only
do states designate what items are cultural property, as noted
above, but they are the only entities competent to do so. The
definition does not contemplate the designation by indigenous
peoples of objects sacred to them as cultural property. The
state-centric element is also apparent in that the cultural signif-
icance of objects is determined by "importance for archaeol-
ogy, prehistory, history, literature, art or science," not by im-
portance to the cultural identity of a people or group. The
values stated are largely external to the cultural identity of a
people or group. Is the judgment that of a living people, de-
fining for themselves their relationship to the world, or the
judgment of external academics applying some sort of absolute
criteria? The recognition of "religious or secular grounds"
upon which to base the importance of cultural property is in-
sufficient entry for the significance of objects to peoples or
groups. The Preamble suggests recognition of the importance
of cultural property to cultural identity, but even here the na-
tion-state is the unit of identity, not the ethnic group or indige-
nous people to whom such objects may have the greatest cul-
tural significance. 2
C. Who Owns the Past?
Setting aside the questions of what is to be protected, and
who shall define it, concentration on the property aspect of
cultural property inevitably raises the question, "Who Owns
The Past? ' 23 If cultural property can be properly defined, who
may own it? Is "ownership" of cultural property even possi-
ble? The problem of ownership has several facets.
22. UNESCO 1970, supra note 17, pmbl., 823 U.N.T.S. at 232-34, 10 I.L.M. at
289. The Preamble includes the following statement: "Considering that cultural
property constitutes one of the basic elements of civilization and national culture, and
that its true value can be appreciated only in relation to the fullest possible informa-
tion regarding its origin, history and traditional setting." Id. (emphasis added). Sim-
ilarly, Article 4 recognizes the importance of the categories of cultural property iden-
tified in Article I to the "cultural heritage of each State." 823 U.N.T.S. at 236-38, 10
I.L.M. at 290 (emphasis added).
23. LEVA, supra note 6, at 74; see also WHO OWNS THE PAST? PAPERS FROM THE
ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM OF THE AUSTRALIAN ACADEMY OF THE HUMANITIES (Isabel Mc-
Bryde, ed. 1985) [hereinafter WHo OWNS THE PAST?].
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A principal text on art law identifies the major problems in
protection of cultural property as (1) illicit trade and (2) repa-
triation.2 4 Both problems involve questions regarding who
may properly own, or possess, cultural property. Trade cannot
be illicit if it does not dispossess someone of the right to licit
trade. Similarly, no one may gain return of cultural property
unless they can show "better title."
Reflecting the dichotomous nature of cultural property,
the question of ownership might be reformulated in two parts.
First, should cultural property be returned to source countries
or peoples? This is the repatriation issue. Second, who is a
legitimate claimant of and who can legitimately release cultural
property to the possession of another? This is the replevin is-
sue. A rough way of classifying these issues is that the first is a
human rights/self-determination issue, and the second is a
property issue. Repatriation is a moral issue concerned with
right treatment of diverse cultures and objects significant to
them. Accordingly, the focus of this moral inquiry. is on the
cultural significance, the cultural aspect of cultural property.
Replevin is a title issue, based on who has a superior right to
possess particular items of cultural property, defined by objec-
tive criteria. Its focus is the property aspect of cultural prop-
erty.
In addition to the possessory interests suggested by the
question of who owns the past, there are myriad interests
based on use and enjoyment. These interests may be divided
into those of the source nations and those of acquisitive na-
tions,.2 5 although there is some overlap between them. For
24. Compare LEVA, supra note 6, at 46 with id. at 47 (identifying critical phenom-
ena as 1) "the emergence of the concept of cultural property," 2) "circulation" of
cultural property, and 3) "artificial acculturation of the exotic" in the course of colo-
nization"). The last phenomenon is
the failure of on the part of the Europeans to understand the real values
enshrined in non-European cultures, combined with the ever-more pro-
nounced rejection of these same values by non-Europeans, themselves sub-
jected to an intensive bombardment of concepts and techniques imported in
the name of development. This has led to a sudden discovery of 'primitive
art' at the very moment when its creators are turning away from it in a
search for the symbols of so-called modem civilization. The trend to invest
cultural goods with materialistic values, which began in Europe and the
United States, is thus spreading rapidly to the rest of the world.
Id.
25. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, An Essay On The International Trade In Art, 34 STAN. L.
10431992-1993]
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source nations, the first interest is specific cultural value, or
concern over wrenching cultural property away from the cul-
ture in which it is embedded. Second, there is an archaeologi-
cal interest in preventing destruction of the records of civiliza-
tion. A third interest is in the integrity of the work of art or
object of cultural property, which means simply that it should
not be dismembered. Fourth is an interest in physical safety of
cultural property from deterioration. A fifth interest is an eco-
nomic one, measured in terms of the price the object would
bring on an open market (intrinsic value), and the tourist dol-
lars generated by presence of the object in a nation (extrinsic
value). Sixth, cultural property has artistic value independent
of its cultural significance. Seventh, is the so-called distribu-
tion interest. Cultural property may demonstrate to the world
the achievements of the culture of a nation if it is disseminated.
Eighth, there is an interest in mere retention, or "hoarding,"
as the right of source nations and peoples.26 Finally, there is
an interest in preserving the national patrimony as a matter of
pride and identity, as well as intrinsic and extrinsic economic
value.27
The interests of acquisitive nations are equally diverse.
First is again the interest in preservation, or the physical safety
of the objects above. Second, there is an interest among colo-
nial powers and victorious powers in times of conflict in the
humiliation of a conquered people by dispossessing them of
their cultural and artistic treasures. Third, there is the interest
of "good faith purchasers" that their ownership or possession
of objects not be unjustly disturbed, or disturbed without com-
pensation. 28 Fourth, acquisitive nations have an interest in en-
riching their own cultural patrimony by acquisition from exter-
nal sources. Fifth, like source nations seeking appreciation of
their culture abroad, acquisitive nations have an interest in the
breakdown of parochialism in a global society. 29 Finally, ac-
REV. 275, 294-310 (1982) (republished as monograph by University of Chicago
Press, 1982) (examining "relevant values" in protection of cultural property); John
H. Merryman & Albert E. Elsen, Hot Art: A Reexamination Of The Illegal International
Trade In Cultural Objects, 12J. ARTS MGMT & L. 5, 8-15 (1982) (cataloguing and analyz-
ing interests in this way).
26. Merryman & Elsen, supra note 25, at 8-11.
27. Bator, supra note 25, at 302-06.
28. Merryman & Elsen, supra note 25, at 11-15.
29. Bator, supra note 25, at 302-10.
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quisitive nations have an interest in maintaining access to cul-
tural property for archaeological purposes.3 °
D. The "Best Interest" of the Objects
There is a zone of strong agreement among the interests
described above. That agreement is on the fundamental im-
portance of preservation of cultural property. The preserva-
tion of cultural property requires measures against the de-
struction, mutilation, or division of sets and collections,3" and
measures to prevent the deterioration as the result of neglect
or environmental damage. This area of agreement reflects the
property aspect of cultural property. Preservation is the first
principle of protection of cultural property because if cultural
property is destroyed the source nations or peoples, as well as
the world heritage at large, are divested of valuable objects.
Destruction makes any question of allocation moot. Deteriora-
tion, vandalism, and accidental damage also diminish the na-
tion's and the world's cultural resources.3 2
Preservation presents another set of difficult issues. Pro-
tection is given different meanings by different people or by
different international instruments. 33 "Protection," it has been
suggested, is sometimes used as a euphemism for nationalistic
retention of cultural property even if that leads directly to de-
30. LEVA, supra note 6, at 62.
31. Bator, supra note 25, at 295, 298.
32. Merryman, supra note 7, at 1917.
33. See, e.g., Merryman, supra note 2, at 833.
While both [UNESCO 1970 and the Convention for the Protection of Cul-
tural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of May 14, 1954 (hereinafter
"Hague 1954")] purport to protect cultural property, they give the term
"protection" different meanings and embody different and somewhat disso-
nant sets of values. In part, the divergence flows naturally from the diverse
subject matters of the two Conventions, one dealing with protection of cul-
tural property from the acts of belligerents in time of war, the other with
international traffic in cultural objects. But the differences in outlook that
are of interest here are fundamental, transcending such distinctions.
Id. Merryman suggests that Hague 1954 was based on "cultural internationalism,"
or cultural property protection for the sake of the world heritage, while UNESCO
1970 was based on "cultural nationalism" elevating national hoarding above interna-
tional protection. Id. at 833-45; see Convention for the Protection of Cultural Prop-
erty in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter
Hague 1954]. The Hague 1954 ushered in "modern" efforts to protect cultural
property.
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terioration or destruction of objects.34 "Protection" may mean
that the objects are so much a part of the cultural identity of a
people or nation that they must remain in or be returned to
that country even if the physical safety of the objects cannot be
assured. 5 This form of protection stresses the cultural aspect
of the object over its physical integrity. In a sense, it is the
culture that is being preserved at the expense of the property
by this form of protection. In the example of the Zuni war
gods,3 6 physical preservation of the objects is diametrically op-
posed to their cultural. function.
The "best interest" of items of cultural property is not
easily determined. It consists of both the physical preservation
of the object and the recognition and protection of its cultural
significance. The dichotomous nature of cultural property
complicates protection of such objects. On the one hand is the
demand to treat objects as valuable property that must be pre-
served from physical destruction and deterioration. On the
other hand is the argument that treats objects as culturally sig-
nificant, the cultural significance of the objects will be lessened
or destroyed, as will their culture, by separating these objects
from their cultural context. If preservation of cultural prop-
erty is fundamental, then the proposals offered to accomplish
that task must address the dichotomy as well. The following
two parts examine how the existing network of international
accords seeks to preserve cultural property and the poles of
argument within the field, including various proposals offered
to resolve the conflicts.
II. THE HISTORY OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
This century has seen the development of several overlap-
ping efforts to protect cultural property in international and
domestic law. 7 They are protection of cultural property from
34. Id. at 844.
35. See, e.g. ,Jonathan S. Moore, Enforcing Foreign Ownership Claims In the Antiquities
Market, 97 YALE L.J. 466, 467 (1988) (discussing inability of source nations to protect
or preserve objects of cultural significance because of lack of resources, training, and
funding).
36. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing Zuni War gods).
37. See generally Hague 1954, supra note 33, 249 U.N.T.S. 240. The Hague 1954
ushered in "modem" efforts to protect cultural property. See Gael M. Graham, Pro-
1992-1993] PROTECTING CULTURAL PROPERTY 1047
the effects of armed conflict, protection of historic monuments
for the benefit of national or world heritage, state ownership
laws, laws regulating the flow of cultural property in. and out of
states, and the current phase emphasizing repatriation of ob-
jects of cultural significance to source nations or peoples.38
This Part surveys these efforts to protect cultural property.
A. Protection From the Rigors of War
The first effort in modem cultural property protection was
recognition of a duty to protect cultural property during
armed conflict. The Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of May 14, 1954
("Hague 1954") defined cultural property, 9 established the
principle of protection of cultural property during time of war
as "comprising the safeguarding of and respect for such prop-
tection And Reversion Of Cultural Property: Issues Of Definition And Justification, 21 INT'L
LAw. 755 (1987) (presenting discussions of earlier efforts to protect cultural property
from Middle Ages forward, including national and regional regimes); John Mous-
takas, Group Rights In Cultural Property: Justifying Strict Inalienability, 74 CORNELL L. REV.
1179 (1989) (discussing concept of protection of cultural property beginning with
ancient Greeks).
38. There are several useful sources surveying the development of the interna-
tional framework for protection of cultural property. See generally COMPENDIUM, Supra
note 17 (containing complete texts of several of principal documents); WILLIAMS,
supra note 17 (containing complete texts of several of principal documents); Detlev
C. Dicke, The Instruments And The Agencies Of The International Protection Of Cultural Prop-
erty, in ILPCP, supra note 16, at 17-43 (identifying institutions and instruments for
protection of cultural property); Bator, supra note 25; P. J. O'KEEFE & LYNDEL V.
PROTr, PREPARING STUDENTS FOR PRACrICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1984) (detailing
legal framework surrounding discovery, excavation, and movement of objects of cul-
tural significance); RIDHA FRAOUA, LE TRAFIC ILLICrrE DES BIENS CULTURELS ET LEUR
RESTITUTION (1985); AngelaJoy Davis, Beyond Repatriation: A Proposal For the Equitable
Restitution Of Cultural Property, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 642, 647-55 (1985); James A. R.
Nafziger, The New International Legal Framework For The Return, Restitution Or Forfeiture
Of Cultural Property, 15 INT'L L. & POL. 789 (1983).
39. Hague 1954, supra note 33, art. 1, 249 U.N.T.S. at 240. Article 1 states that
the convention covers three classes of property, irrespective of ownership:
(a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural
heritage of every people, such as monuments of architecture, art or history,
whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of buildings which,
as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts,
books and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as
well as scientific collections and important collections of books or archives
or of reproductions of the property defined above; .
(b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit
the movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph (a) such as muse-
ums, large libraries and depositories of archives, and refuges intended to
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erty, ' 40 provided for the distinctive marking of cultural prop-
erty to facilitate its recognition, 4' and defined the actions mili-
tary forces were to take to protect cultural property. 42 The ra-
tionale of the Hague 1954 was to prevent damage to the
cultural wealth of both the world community and individual
nations.43 Hague 1954 has enjoyed wide, but not universal,
ratification."
The United States rejected Hague 1954. The position of
the Department of State was that "the major difficulty [with
Hague 1954] is that adherence to the Convention would seri-
ously limit the options of the United States in the event of nu-
clear war or even in some cases of conventional bombard-
ment."' 45 The United States government did not want to sign
shelter, in the event of armed conflict, the movable cultural property de-
fined in sub-paragraph (a);
(c) centres containing a large amount of cultural property as defined in
sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), to be known as "centres containing monu-
ments".
Id.; cf. UNESCO 1970, supra note 17, art. 1, 823 U.N.T.S. at 234-36, 10 I.L.M. at 289-
90 (defining cultural property); CPIA, 19 U.S.C. § 2601 (1988) (defining cultural
property).
40. UNESCO 1970, supra note 17, art. 2, 823 U.N.T.S. at 236. Protocol I to the
1949 Geneva Convention, produced by the Diplomatic Conference of 1974-77, in-
cluded in Article 51, paragraph 6, prohibition of reprisals against cultural' property.
Inclusion of the provisions concerning cultural property was a direct result of Hague
1954. See George H. Aldrich, Prospects For United States Ratification Of Additional Protocol
I To the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 85 AM.J. INT'L L. 1 (1991).
41. UNESCO 1970, supra note 17, art. 6, 823 U.N.T.S. at 240.
42. Id. arts. 7-19, 823 U.N.T.S. at 240-46, 10 I.L.M. at 291-92.
43. Id. pmbl., 823 U.N.T.S. at 232-34, 10 I.L.M. at 289. The Preamble states in
part:
Being convinced that damage to cultural property belonging to any people
whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each
people makes its contribution to the culture of the world;
Considering that the preservation of the cultural heritage is of great
importance for all peoples of the world and that it is important that this
heritage should receive international protection.
Id. See supra note 33 (discussing cultural internationalism).
44. See COMPENDIUM, supra note 17, at 355 (listing states that have acceded to or
ratified Hague 1954).
45. Letter from Ronald J. Bettauer, Attorney, Office of the Legal Advisor Dept.
of State, to Anne Coffin Hanson, President, College Art Association of America, in 31
ARTJ. 488 (1972). The State Department position was presented by Ronald J. Bet-
tauer, Attorney, Office of the Legal Adviser Department of State, in response to a
letter urging U.S. ratification of the Convention by Anne Coffin Hanson, President,
College Art Association of America. Id.
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on to a convention unless it could live up to its terms. 46 None-
theless, U.S. military personnel have been continually briefed
on their responsibility to preserve and protect cultural prop-
erty since World War II.4 7 According to General Eisenhower,
in 1943, "military necessity" justifying destruction of cultural
property should be interpreted as narrowly as possible.48
In addition to treaty protection of cultural property during
times of armed conflict, international law governs the restitu-
tion of cultural property looted from conquered countries.
Since the time of Napoleon's conquests, the restitution of cul-
tural property looted by victorious armies prevails as a rule of
customary international law. 49 Restitution may be the norm
for objects looted during armed conflict, but objects removed
by economic or colonial conquest are treated differently. The
products of so-called "Elginism," after the man who brought
the Parthenon Marbles to England, have often remained in the
acquisitive nation. 0
Hague 1954 balanced protection of both the "physical"
and cultural aspects of cultural property, or at least did not
significantly elevate protection of one over the other. The
physical integrity of the cultural property designated was cer-
tainly the goal of the treaty, but the rationale for that protec-
tion was recognition of the cultural significance of the things
protected to both a specific culture and the world community.
B. Protection of Monuments and the World Cultural Heritage
Although this paper is primarily concerned with the pro-
tection of movable cultural property, a brief survey of the
means of protecting non-movable cultural treasures is appro-
priate to understanding the legal framework. This effort in the
protection of cultural property overlapped all of the other de-
46. Id.
47. REPORT OF THE AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION AND SALVAGE OF
ARTISTIC MONUMENTS IN WAR AREAS 48-49 (1946).
48. See id. at 61 (noting military obligation to preserve and protect objects to
greatest extent possible).
49. Sayre, supra note 9, at 853. Sayre also provides examples of the restitution
of cultural property after World War I and World War II. Id.
50. Id. at 855. In 1801, Lord Elgin, the British Ambassador to Constantinople,
claimed to have received permission from the Turkish government to remove the
sculptural decoration from the Parthenon in Athens. Id.; see also LEVA, supra note 6,
at 12-13.
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velopments discussed in this section. The principal modern
international instrument for the protection of cultural monu-
ments and sites is the UNESCO Convention for the Protection
of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage ("UNESCO
1972").5 ' The means of protecting monuments and sites of
cultural significance under. the UNESCO 1972 involved the
creation of a World Heritage Fund financed by contributions
from signatory states based on a percentage of their annual
UNESCO dues. The funds collected were then used to pro-
vide both advice and financing for preservation of sites of cul-
tural significance. 52
Various nations have their own programs for the preserva-
tion of sites of cultural significance. Two examples will suffice.
The government of England provides for the preservation of
medieval structures, restricts the exportation of famous paint-
ings, and preserves forests under the National Heritage Act of
1983. 5s The protection of culturally significant sites in Japan is
founded on the Historic Sites, Places of Scenic Beauty, and Na-
tional Monuments Preservation Law (1919), the National Trea-
sure Law (1929), and the Important Cultural Property Preser-
vatiori Act (1933). 51
A balanced approach to protection of the cultural and
property aspects .of this non-movable cultural property is again
apparent. What these laws and treaties and the treaty protect-
ing cultural properity from the rigors of war suggest, however,
is that such balance is more easily achieved when movement of
the cultural properties is not contemplated. The objects or
monuments were to be protected in their cultural context, lo-
51. UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter UNESCO
1972]; see Raymond H. Goy, The International Protection of the Cultural and Natural Heri-
tage, 4 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 117, 128-41 (1973) (discussing UNESCO 1972); Sayre,
supra note 9, at 837-39 (discussing UNESCO 1972).
52. See UNESCO 1972, supra note 51, arts. 16-19, 27 U.S.T. at 45-46, 1037
U.N.T.S. at 158-59.
53. National Heritage Act, 1983, ch. 47 (Eng.), reprinted in 32 HALSBURY'S STAT-
UTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 391- 406 (4th ed. 1987); see Joseph L. Sax, Is Anyone
Minding Stonehenge? The Origins of Cultural Property Protection in England, 78 CAL. L. REV.
1543, 1551 (1990) (examining English laws).
54. See LLoyd Craighill, National Treasures, in 5 KODANSHA ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JA-
PAN 348 (1983) (concerning Japan's cultural property laws); Kitamura Bunji, Cultural
Properties Law, in 2 KODANSHA ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JAPAN 52 (1983); Emily J. Sano, A
Passion for Collecting, A Commitment to Preservation, ARTNEWS, Sept. 1981, at 106.
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cated within the cultures that created them. The property as-
pect becomes preeminent in the regulation of the movement
of objects.,
C. Laws Establishing State Ownership of Cultural Property
Another effort in the development of a framework for the
protection of cultural property that overlapped other develop-
ments was the establishment 'of national ownership laws. 55
These laws are significant to a discussion of the international
framework because of the impact they have had on application
of conventions and on domestic case law concerning trade in
cultural property. Several states enacted such laws following
ratification of UNESCO 1970. As a prerequisite to protection
under UNESCO 1970, countries of origin had to take meas-
ures consistent with this convention to protect their cultural
patrimony. 56 Those measures often included designation of
cultural property as property of the country of origin. Mexico,
for example, passed a state ownership law in 1972.57
State ownership laws typically establish that all "antiqui-
ties" are government property, even if ownership is a concept
foreign to the cultural context of such items. Even undiscov-
ered antiquities in which no one has a possessory interest are
nationalized. If a developer discovers an object of archaeo-
logical interest in the course-of a building project, the object is
government property regardless of who owns the land and in
spite of the fact that.no one knew that the object was located
on the site prior to the excavation.5" The laws generally apply
55. See. COMPENDIUM, supra note 17, at 30-42 (surveying state ownership laws);
see generally Halina Niec, Legislative Models of Protection of Cultural Property, 27 HASTINGS
L.J. 1089 (1976) (surveying state ownership laws); Moustakas, supra note 37 (arguing
to strengthen state ownership laws). Merryman suggests that citizens of source na-
tions find such laws unacceptable. See John H. Merryman, The Retention of Cultural
Property, 21 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 477, 487 (1988) ("The political problem is that citi-
zens in the source nation are likely to oppose implementation of [national ownership]
legislation unless unusually generous compensation is provided.") Id.
56. UNESCO 1972, supra note 51, arts. 5, 12-14, 27 U.S.T. at 41, 44, 1037
U.N.T.S. at 154, 156-58.
57. See United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1979). A number of
other Latin American countries, including Guatemala, Ecuador, and Costa Rica, have
laws declaring state ownership of cultural property. See LYNDEL V. PROTT & P.J.
O'KEEFE, 1 LAw AND THE CULTURAL HERITAGE 188-97 (1984); United States v. Hol-
linshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1974) (discussing Guatemalan law).
58. Jonathan S. Moore, Enforcing Foreign Ownership Claims in the Antiquities Market,
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to objects already in collections as well.59
State ownership laws can have an impact on the protection
of cultural property apart from their implications under
UNESCO 1970. In the case of United States v. McClain,60 the
court based criminal penalties for importing Mexican cultural
property on the interplay of the Mexican state ownership law
and the United States National Stolen Property Act
("N.S.P.A."). 6' The court applied the N.S.P.A. to dealings in
illegally stolen cultural property.6 2 The court in McClain held
that cultural property designated as owned by a particular na-
tion was incapable of private ownership or conveyance, and,
therefore, those trafficking in such items dealt in stolen goods,
prohibited by the N.S.P.A. 63
D. Regulation of Traffic in Cultural Property
Efforts to establish state ownership worked in conjunction
with attempts to regulate the flow of objects of cultural signifi-
cance in and out of source countries and market countries.
The close relationship between ownership laws and import-ex-
port laws can be seen in the four kinds of retention laws identi-
fied by Professors Merryman and Elsen: (1) total prohibitions
on exchanges (Mexico and Guatemala), (2) prohibition of ex-
port of designated objects of national importance (Italy and
France), (3) laws routinely awarding export licenses (Great
Britain and Canada), and (4) laws with no limitations on export
97 YALE L.J. 466, 467 n.6 (1988). The premise of Moore's argument is that the
United States should recognize such "umbrella" ownership laws. Id. at 467.
59. Id. at 471-72; see also John H. Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1881, 1890 (1985) (discussing purpose of national ownership laws as
facilitating replevin claims and raising stolen property liability in importing coun-
tries).
60. 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977) and 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979) (decided in
two stages).
61. United States National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2314, 2315
(1988 & Supp. 11 1990) [hereinafter the N.S.P.A.]. The N.S.P.A. allows criminal pen-
alties of up to U.S.$10,000 in fine or five years in prison or both for conspiring to
import or trade stolen property. Id. It allows penalties of up to US$10,000 fine or
ten years in prison or both for transportation of stolen property into or within the
United States. Id. Finally, the N.S.P.A. allows penalties of up to US$10,000 or ten
years in prison or both for selling or receiving stolen property. Id. § 2314.
62. McClain, 593 F.2d at 663-66.
63. 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977) and 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979) (decided in
two stages).
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(the United States).'
An unsuccessful attempt to marry ownership laws with im-
port-export laws can be seen from the example of New Zea-
land. New Zealand enacted legislation providing for automatic
forfeiture of illegally exported cultural property.6 5 In effect,
the New Zealand law would make the state the owner of any
illegally exported object, which it could then pursue. In Attor-
ney-General of New Zealand v. Ortiz,66 a British court held that
forfeiture required actual seizure of the object. 67 Lord Den-
ning, in one of the majority opinions, reasoned that if New
Zealand's Historic Articles Act provided for the automatic for-
feiture of an historic article illegally exported from New Zea-
land, then New Zealand could recover that article in any im-
porting country. Denning found that interpreting the Act in
this way would "infringe the rule of international law which
says that no country can legislate so as to affect the rights of
property when that property is situated beyond the limits of its
own territory. It is a direct infringement of the territorial the-
ory of sovereignty .... "68
The primary international instrument regulating traffick-
ing in cultural property is the Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 14 May 1970,
known as UNESCO 1970.69 'In pursuit of the purpose of
UNESCO 1970, to inhibit the "illicit" international trade in
cultural objects, the parties (1) agree to oppose the "impover-
ishment of the cultural heritage" of a nation through "illicit
import, export and transfer of ownership" of cultural prop-
64. LEVA, supra note 6, at 53.
65. Historic Articles Act, 1962 N.Z. Stat. No. 37; Historic Articles Act Amend-
ment, 1968 N.Z. Stat. No. 35 § 100 (New Zealand).
66. Attorney-General of New Zealand v. Ortiz, 2 W.L.R. 809 (H.L. 1983), arffd 2 Q.B.
349 (Eng. C.A. 1982).
67. Merryman, supra note 7, at 1892.
68. 3 W.L.R. 570, 580 [Eng. C.A. 1982] (emphasis added) (citing The Apollon,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824)); see Monroe Leigh, Judicial Decisions, 3 W.L.R.
570, 77 AM.J. INT'L L. 631 (1983) (analyzing Attorney-General of New Zealand v. Ortiz).
69. See UNESCO 1970, supra note 17; Lyndel V. Prott, International Control of
Illicit Movement of the Cultural Heritage: The 1970 UNESCO Convention and Some Possible
Alternatives, 10 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 333 (1983) (concerning international regula-
tion of trafficking in cultural property); P.J. O'Keefe, Export and Import Controls On
Movement Of The Cultural Heritage: Problems At the National Level, 10 SYR. J. INT'L L. &
COM. 352 (1983) (concerning domestic efforts to control flow of cultural property).
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erty,7 ° (2) agree that trade in cultural objects exported con-
trary to the law of the nation of origin is "illicit,""' and (3)
agree to prevent the importation of such objects and facilitate
their return to source nations.72 The motivation for drafting
UNESCO 1970 was the realization that cultural property of
many countries was being stripped to fill major museums and
private collections in a few acquisitive nations." Only the first
agreement of the parties mentioned above is based on a pri-
mary concern for the cultural aspect of cultural property. The
remaining two agreements treat cultural property as property.
There are several difficulties with UNESCO 1970 in con-
tent and implementation. First, of the large importing nations,
only the United States and Canada have ratified UNESCO
1970, TM and in the United States implementing legislation took
until 1983 to pass Congress.7 5 Other major acquisitive nations
have been hampered by umbrella agreements concerning free
trade. "In the past the effect of the EEC has been to prevent
countries especially rich in art treasures, such as Italy, from ef-
fectively controlling the export of their cultural property
.... 76 Second, the Convention also presents problems for
source nations, often lesser developed countries with limited
economic resources. The Convention calls for countries to de-
velop awareness of moral obligations to respect cultural heri-
tage and to take measures to inventory and protect cultural
property. But,
[A]wareness of moral obligations to respect cultural heri-
tage merely underscores the structural deficiencies of na-
tional and international cultural property law. Awareness
70. See UNESCO 1970, supra note 17, art. 2, 823 U.N.T.S at 236, 10 I.L.M. at
290.
71. .d. art. 3, 823 U.N.T.S. at 236.
72. Id. arts. 7, 9, 13, 823 U.N.T.S. at 240, 242, 244.
73. Bator, supra note 25, at 280.
74. John H. Merryman, BooK REVIEW, 85 AM.J. INT'L L. 737, 739 (1991).
75. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also, Marian N. Leich, Contempo-
rary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 611
(1982) (describing drafting, passage, and implementation of CPIA). The United
States reserved the right to determine whether or not to impose export controls over
cultural property, and, inter alia, understood the Convention not to alter property
interests under the laws of states. Id.; see LEVA, supra note 6, at 95-96 (recording
reservations and "understandings" that accompanied initial U.S. ratification of Con-
vention in 1972)
76. JEANETrE GREENFIELD, THE RETURN OF CULTURAL TREASURES 139 (1989).
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alone does nothing to remedy the underlying socio-eco-
nomic factors that encourage the international trade in il-
licit antiquities and art treasures. 77The costs, of adequate
measures, and of pursuing repatriation claims for cultural
property around the world, may simply be beyond the
means of lesser developed source nations. 78 A third diffi-
culty with UNESCO 1970 is that it lacks effective means for
resolving disputes.79
A different kind of criticism has also been leveled at both
state ownership laws and import-export controls. The argu-
ment is that such laws reflect an invidious "cultural national-
ism" that allows large. stocks of objects of cultural significance
to go undocumented, unhoused, unprotected, and undiscov-
ered, but subject to export control. Furthermore, such laws
may actually foster covert and callous excavation and export of
cultural property on a black market to circumvent the regula-
tory framework.80
E. The Movement Toward Repatriation
Several phenomena suggest that once objects of cultural
significance have been protected from the rigors of armed con-
flict, and from illicit trafficking, the next concern of source na-
77. Sayre, supra note 9, at 880.
78. Id. at 886-87.
Most developing countries simply do not have the resources to implement
the services required to protect cultural property against theft, illegal ex-
portation, and decay, let alone the means to promote related educational
exchange programs. The domestic art market in these nations is not able to
compete with the inflated prices offered by collectors and dealers in
London, New York, or Tokyo; and compulsory purchase provisions usually
penalize national owners of registered property.
Id.
79. Ann P. Prunty, Toward Establishing an International Tribunal for the Settlement of
Cultural Property Disputes: How to Keep Greece from Losing Its Marbles, 72 GEO. L.J. 1155,
1159-60 (1984).
The Convention specifically addresses the problem of dispute resolution at
only one point. Subsection 5 of article 17 provides that '[alt the request of
at least two States Parties to this Convention which are engaged in a dispute
over its implementation, UNESCO may extend its good offices to reach a
settlement between them.'
Id. The Convention provides no further procedure or mechanism for the resolution
of disputes. Id.
80. See John H. Merryman, International Art Law: From Cultural Nationalism to a
Common Cultural Heritage, 15 N.Y.UJ. Irr'L L. & POL. 757, 759-60 (1983) (discussing
argument); LEVA, supra note 6, at 69.
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tions and peoples is with repatriation of their cultural patri-
mony removed abroad."' This development suggests a revital-
ization of awareness of the cultural aspect of such objects.
Repatriation is an underlying theme of UNESCO 1970 and of a
series of United Nations General Assembly and European Par-
liament resolutions since adoption of that Convention. 2 Re-
patriation in practice may have one of several meanings, in-
cluding (1) repurchase of objects for return to their source na-
tion or people (repatriation beyond the means of most source
nations), (2) theft (on the principle that the end justifies the
means, and the property belongs in the source nation), and (3)
repatriation by agreement. The third form may be for one or
more purposes, which includes altruism, retaining access to
the source nation's riches, and preventing legal entangle-
ments."3 UNESCO and the Council of Europe encourage vol-
untary repatriation. 4
The recent attempts of New Zealand in Ortiz,"' and Greece
in gaining return of the "Elgin" Marbles taken from the Par-
81. See generally RIDHA FRAOUA, LE TRAFIC ILLICITE DES BIENS CULTURELS ET LEUR
RESTITUTION: ANALYSE DES RiGLEMENTATIONS NATIONALES ET INTERNATIONALES CRITI-
QUES ET PROPOSITIONS 113-210 (1985). The obligation to grant restitution of cul-
tural property, looted during war time, has evolved into an accepted norm of custom-
ary international law. See also Sayre, supra note 9, at 853.
82. Merryman described this phenomenon, although with disapproval in Two
Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property. Merryman, supra note 2, at 845.
Since the promulgation of UNESCO 1970, the attention of source nations
has turned to what is now generally called "repatriation": the return of cul-
tural objects to nations of origin (or to the nations whose people include
the cultural descendants of those who made the objects; or to the nations
whose territory includes their original sites or the sites from which they were
last removed). Beginning in 1973, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted a series of resolutions calling for the restitution of cultural property
to countries of origin. In 1978 UNESCO established the Intergovernmental
Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries
of Origin or its Restitution in Case of Illicit Appropriation, and in 1983 the
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly adopted a Resolution on Return
of Works of Art. The premises of the repatriation movement are a logical
extension of those that underlie UNESCO 1970: cultural property belongs
in the source country; works that now reside abroad in museums and collec-
tions are wrongfully there (the result of plunder, removal by colonial pow-
ers, theft, illegal export or exploitation) and should be 'repatriated.'
Id. (citations omitted).
83. LEVA, supra note 6, at 124-25.
84. Merryman, supra note 7, at 1893.
85. Attorney-General of New Zealand v. Ortiz, 2 W.L.R. 809 (H.L. 1983), affd 2
QB. 349 (Eng. C.A. 1982).
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thenon, were unhappy examples of efforts to seek repatriation.
There have been, however, important successes as well. For
example, the case of Autocephalous Church v. Goldberg & Feldman
Fine Arts, Inc. 86 involved mosaics removed from a Greek Ortho-
dox church in the Turkish-controlled part of Cyprus." The
Turkish government had allowed removal and exportation of
the mosaics, which were ultimately imported into the United
States by Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc. in 1988.88 The
Greek Orthodox church, a legal citizen of the Greek part of
Cyprus, learned of the presence of the mosaics in the United
States. The church sought the return of the mosaics as their
rightful owner, arguing that Turkey had no right to certify ex-
portation of the mosaics. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit decided in 1990 that the mosaics were
the property of the Autocephalous Church, and must be re-
turned to it.8 9
A second example of a successful effort at repatriation of
cultural property was the passage of the Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (the "NAGPRA") by
the Congress of the United States in 1990.90 Section 3 of the
NAGPRA defines ownership of Native American remains and
objects based on classifications of affiliation, location, and cir-
cumstances of discovery. 9 ' Section 4 prohibits illegal traffick-
ing in objects of cultural significance. 92 The real achievement
of the NAGPRA, however, is that Section 5 requires all muse-
ums receiving federal funds to inventory holdings of cultural
property and human remains of Native Americans, while Sec-
86. Autocephalous Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278
(7th Cir. 1990). The case is technically one of "replevin" under the two-tiered
framework because the legal basis for the decision was the "better title" of the Greek
Orthodox Church over an art gallery. Id. The goal, however, was certainly "repatria-
tion" in the sense of returning property to the source nation because of cultural
affiliation. Id.
87. Id., 917 F.2d at 280.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 293-94.
90. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 3001-3013 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) [hereinafter NAGPRA]. The author has ar-
gued that passage of this Act was a manifestation of the right of cultural self-determi-
nation. Roger W. Mastalir, A Model for Recognition of the Right to Cultural Self-
Determination of Indigenous Peoples: Native American Graves Protection and Re-
patriation Act (Apr. 1992) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
91. NAGPRA, supra note 90, § 3002 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
92. Id.
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tion 7 mandates repatriation of all such items, with limited ex-
ceptions, in consultation with Native American organiza-
tions.93 In a single act, an entire category of cultural property
was mandated for return to source peoples.
What is fascinating about the Autocephalous case and pas-
sage of the NAGPRA is that repatriation was to be made to a
religious organization, in the one case, and to an indigenous
people, in the other, rather than to the government of a na-
tion-state. The contrast to the repatriation provisions and
state-centered orientation of UNESCO 1970 is interesting.
Nations and courts have demonstrated a willingness to return
cultural property to groups with whom it has a clear cultural
affiliation, but not to governments acting on behalf of such
groups, as was the case in Ortiz94 and with the "Elgin" Marbles.
With this in mind, we consider next the poles of the arguments
concerning protection of cultural property.
III. THE POLES OF THE ARGUMENT OVER PROTECTION
OF CULTURAL PROPERTY- THE CULTURAL
ASPECT v. THE PROPERTY ASPECT
A concern for protection of cultural property is consistent
with the emergence of international laws and institutions pro-
tecting human rights.95 For many source nations, peoples, and
adherents to their cause, the protection and repatriation of cul-
tural property is solely a human rights issue. For many repre-
sentatives of acquisitive nations, museums, and collectors, it is
a property question. For some, arguments linking cultural
property with property principles misses the essential nature of
the question of protecting and respecting cultural property.
For others, arguments linking cultural property and human
rights are merely "sentimental. ' 96 Under the influence ofJohn
Henry Merryman, these two poles of argument are usually de-
scribed respectively as "cultural nationalism" and "cultural in-
ternationalism." '97 This Part will define the poles of the argu-
93. Id.
94. Attorney-General of New Zealand v. Ortiz, 2 W.L.R. 809 (H.L. 1983), afd 2
QB. 349 (Eng. C.A. 1982).
95. See UNESCO, CULTURAL RIGHTS As HUMAN RIGHTS, STUDIES AND Docu-
MENTS ON CULTURAL POLICIES (1970).
96. Merryman, supra note 7, at 1883.
97. See generally Merryman, supra note 2 (labelling and defining "cultural nation-
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ment over the "best interests" to be served in protecting cul-
tural property, demonstrate the misconceptions in describing
the polar positions in terms of "internationalism" and "nation-
alism," and survey various proposals for resolution of disputes
between the human rights and property law camps.
A. Internationalism or Preeminence of the Property. Aspect?
Professor Merryman, 98 the champion of what he calls "cul-
tural internationalism," uses the case of the "Elgin" Marbles,
removed from the Parthenon in. Athens and now residing in
the British Museum, to demonstrate the principles upon which
a reasoned resolution of cultural property disputes should be
based. He rejects the emotional appeal of the Greek position,
that the Marbles were products of Greek culture, were inap-
propriately removed and must be returned. He rejects "cul-
alism" and "cultural internationalism"); see also Merryman, supra note 74, at 741
(presenting positions and champions of two camps).
There are two contrasting points of view. One faction, full of passionate
intensity, identifies strongly with the preferences of source nations. To
these fundamentalists [i.e., "cultural nationalists"], cultural objects (they
prefer emotive terms like 'cultural patrimony' or 'cultural heritage') belong
within the boundaries of the nation of origin and should stay there. If found
abroad, they should be 'repatriated.' Their objective is a system of cultural
property law that requires the nation in which a cultural object is found to
return it to the source nation.
Others [i.e., 'cuitural internationalists'], 'while they do not lack all con-
viction, make distinctions between different kinds of cultural objects, be-
tween theft and illegal export, between stale and fresh claims, between good
and bad faith, and find it difficult to ignore other arguably relevant consid-
erations. In place of the attractive simplicity of the fundamentalist position,
these realists offer complication. They contemplate the possibility that in
some cases the demand for the return of cultural objects, whatever its na-
tionalist justification, serves no substantial international interest. Cultural
internationalists profess that the international art trade is not always inher-
ently evil; that a licit market in cultural objects may under some circum-
stances better serve the preservation of and access to the human record than
rigorous, but unenforceable, national controls .which the black market inevi-
tably dominates; that, indeed, in extreme circumstances some cultural ob-
jects might better be removed from nations of origin than left there.
Id. Lyndel V. Prott and P.J. O'Keefe are solidly in the fundamentalist camp. See
LYNDEL V. PRo-rr AND P.J. O'KEEFE, 3 LAW AND THE CULTURAL HERITAGE (1989). The
author, however, is in the other.
98. Professor Merryman has formulated most of the vocabulary and issues of
"art law" and cultural property. His contributions to the scholarly literature are both
rich and varied and always fruitful ground for controversy. An understanding of the
issues in the protection of cultural property is incomplete without an awareness of
Professor Merryman's writings.,
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tural nationalism" as a basis for the disposition of the Marbles.
Professor Merryman argues that "cultural nationalism" ex-
presses dubious values, such as mere possession by a state
which has not housed, protected, or studied the objects ade-
quately.9 9 Further, he argues. that the Greek position is
founded on "sentiment."'' 00 He concludes that the Greeks do
not have a legal claim to the Marbles and that moral arguments
fail to justify the return of the Marbles to Greece.''
Professor Merryman seeks general principles that should
govern the allocation of cultural property. Those principles
may be found in "cultural internationalism" and property law.
The concerns of "cultural internationalism," which he defines
as preservation, integrity, and distribution/access, do not
clearly support the Greek position. 0 2 Under the general prop-
erty law principle of repose, the Elgin Marbles should remain
in the British Museum until the Greek government can offer
more compelling reasons for their return.10 3 A related prop-
erty law concept put forward by this school of thought is that
those seeking restitution of cultural property must demon-
strate due diligence in seeking its return.10
4
Professor Merryman's three principles of "cultural inter-
nationalism" are essentially property concepts. Property may
be physically preserved, its integrity may be maintained, and
its distribution may be controlled, for example by customs reg-
ulations and property law principles of repose and good faith
purchase. Professor Merryman is willing to go so far as to ar-
gue that cultural property is a product of the market and
should be treated like fungible goods suitable for trade. 0 5
Where then is the "internationalism" in "cultural interna-
tionalism?" It is in the collateral arguments for allowing cur-
99. Merryman, supra note 7, at 1891.
100. Id. at 1883.
101. Id. at 1910.
102. Id. at 1917.
103. Id. at 1911.
104. See Stephen L. Foutty, Recent Development, Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox
Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.: Entrenchment of the Due Diligence
Requirement in Replevin Actions for Stolen Art, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1839 (1990) (presenting
arguments for "due diligence" requirement in cases concerning restitution of art and
other cultural property).
105. John H. Merryman, The Retention of Cultural Property, 21 U. C. DAVIs L. REV.
477, 500 (1988).
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rent holders of disputed cultural property, usually economi-
cally wealthy nations, to retain possession of the "property."
The first principle of internationalism, preservation, lends it-
self to an internationalist credo based on preservation of cul-
tural property for the "world heritage," or "common heritage
of mankind."'10 6 Wider diffusion of objects of cultural signifi-
cance throughout the world community then becomes a means
of improving cultural understanding.0 7
A final proposition of this pole of the argument is that
preservation of cultural property can be best effected by ac-
quisitive nations. It is therefore in the best interest of both the
world's common heritage and items of cultural property them-
selves that such property be left in the hands of possessors who
can protect them from deterioration or damage.' 08 In a
number of cases, export has been the only reason items of cul-
tural property have been preserved. 10 9 Acquisitive nations,
106. This is the language found in the Preamble to Hague 1954 justifying inter-
national efforts to spare cultural property from damage and destruction during
armed conflict. See Hague 1954, supra note 33, pmbl., 249 U.N.T.S. at 240; Isabel
McBryde, Introduction, in WHO OWNS THE PAST?, supra note 23, at 5-6 (noting that
"[i]tems of such supreme achievement [as the Parthenon Marbles] cannot, in this
view, be seen as the possessions of any one nation, but of all mankind"); Bernard
Smith, Art Objects and Historical Usage, in WHO OWNS THE PAST?, supra note 23, at 83
(noting that absorption into universal heritage can be destructive of technologically
weaker source); Moustakas, Group Rights In Cultural Property, supra note 37 (noting
following statements of cultural universalism: Bernard V. Bothmer, Letter to the Ed-
itor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1982, at A30 ("We deplore all destruction in situ, most of it
caused by the indifference of the very people whose past is involved"); CHRISTOPHER
HITCHENS, THE ELGIN MARBLES 98 (1987) ("To rip the Elgin Marbles from the walls
of the British Museum is a much greater disaster than the threat of blowing up the
Parthenon") (quoting British Museum Director Sir David Wilson); T. VRETrOS, A
SHADOW OF MAGNITUDE: THE ACQUISITION OF THE ELGIN MARBLES 82 (1974) ("All
Greeks were peasants. They did not deserve such wonderful works of antiquity.")
(quoting Lord Elgin's response to being told by British counsel that certain takings of
Eleusian statuary were illegal); C. HITCHENS, THE ELGIN MARBLES 26 (1987) ("[T]he
moral order dictates that Britain should keep the Elgin Marbles because Britain is the
'true heir of Pericles' democracy' ") (quoting recent statement of Roger Scranton,
publisher of Salisbury Review).
107. Merryman, supra note 7, at 1908. Merryman suggests that possession is
unnecessary to the enjoyment of cultural value, at least when he is discussing enjoy-
ment by source nations and peoples. Id. at 1913. The paradox of his argument is
that he thinks it is necessary for cultural property to be distributed to the global
community to enhance appreciation of cultures, but individual cultures do not need
to possess items of cultural significance to them to enjoy their cultural value.
108. Id. at 1908.
109. Bator, supra note 25, at 298; John Mulvaney, A Question of Values: Museums
and Cultural Property, in WHO OWNS THE PAST?, supra note 23, at 88.
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their museums, and collectors must not take'a "dog in the
manger" attitude, but refuse to condone looting of cultural
treasures from lesser developed countries. In addition, they
must encourage lesser developed countries to reacquire cul-
tural property on the market."t 0
What this school of thought is really talking about is not
"internationalism" taking pre-eminence over "nationalism,"
but the pre-eminence of the property aspect over the cultural
aspect. The concern is with physical preservation of objects
and with their proper ownership. A regime based on the pre-
eminence of the property aspect gives short shrift to the cul-
tural significance of objects, rejecting it as mere sentimentality.
The position of this school of thought has generally prevailed
in the current regime for the international protection of cul-
tural property.
B. Nationalism or Preeminence of the Cultural Aspect?
At the other pole in the arguments. over the "best inter-
ests" to be served in protection of cultural property is the
school of thought labelled by Professor Merryman as "cultural
nationalism.""' Certainly, the arguments of this school of
thought are "nationalist" to the extent that they rely on affinity
between the objects in question and an identifiable group, peo-
ple, or nation." 2 For this school of thought, the affinity of cul-
tural property with a group makes its protection and repatria-
tion a human rights issue. The claim that cultural property be-
longs to, or, more properly, should be in the possession of a
particular nation or group is founded on the relationship be-
tween sites, objects, and cultural identity. "' The "propinquity
of cultural property to group, culture, or nation" is such that it
becomes 'property for grouphood,' defining and nurturing a
sense of the group.' '4 Cultural property may be "both a mani-
110. David Wilson, Return and Restitution: A Museum Perspective, in WHO OWNS
THE PAST?, supra note 23, at 100, 104-05.
111. See generally LEVA, supra note 6, at 129-130; Merryman, supra note 7; Mer-
ryman, supra, note 2.
112. See KoUMANTOS, supra note 16.
113. See WHO OWNS THE PAST?, supra note 23, at 3-4 (introducing concept of
possession of cultural property). UNESCO 1970 is an example of a Convention with
a tendency toward "cultural nationalism" in its provisions for restitution. Id.
114. Moustakas, supra note 37, at 1184. The relation of cultural property to
culture was also a common theme in the testimony of Native American representa-
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festation and a mirror of [a group's] culture."'' 1 5
In the case of the NAGPRA, the arguments used to sup-
port the request for repatriation of cultural property to Native
Americans were founded on human rights principles. Recog-
nition of human rights was the basis offered for enactment of
the law during public hearings and upon introduction of the
bill on the floor of the House and Senate." l6 For members of
the Panel for a National Dialogue (comprised of representa-
tives from Native American groups and the museum or schol-
arly community) human rights was the basis for allowing tribal
determinations regarding disposition of remains and objects to
prevail" 7 Keeping such items would be to perpetuate a
human rights violation."18  The response of this school of
thought to the argument that cultural property be treated like
property is that the market is a flawed device for the protection
of cultural property."19 On the contrary, cultural property
should be strictly inalienable.1 20 This school finds arguments
for the free flow of cultural property in the market place to be
based on "sophistry."'12' Perhaps for these reasons, the Euro-
tives in support of NAGPRA. Cultural affinity became one of the tests for determin-
ing the appropriate recipient of cultural property to be repatriated under the Act. See
generally Native American Grave And Burial Protection Act (Repatriation); Native American
Repatriation Of Cultural Patrimony Act; And Heard Museum Report: Hearing on S. 1021 and
S. 1980 Before the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 10 1st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)
[hereinafter Hearing]; Roger W. Mastalir, A Model For Recognition Of The Right To
Cultural Self-Determination Of Indigenous Peoples: Native American Graves Pro-
tection and Repatriation Act (Apr. 1992) (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal) (A copy of Hearing was kindly made available to the author by Congressman
David Nagle and the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs).
115. Bator, supra note 25, at 304.
116. Hearing, supra note 114, 1-3 (statement of Sen. Inouye); 136 CONG. REC.
H10,985, H10,988 (1990) (statement of Rep. Campbell).
117. REPORT OF THE PANEL FOR A NATIONAL DIALOGUE ON MUSEuM/NATIVE
AMERICAN RELATIONS 1-2, 11-13 (Feb. 28, 1990) [hereinafter HEARD REPORT] (made
available by William Boyd, President of Field Museum in Chicago). The Report was
the result of consultations between representatives of the museum community and
Native American groups, held at the behest of the 100th Congress, under the aus-
pices of The Heard Museum in Phoenix, Arizona. The Report formed the basis on
which consensus legislation was built, resulting in passage of the NAGPRA during
the 101st Congress. Id.
118. Hearing, supra note 114, at 38 (statement of Paul Bender, Trustee, Heard
Museum, Phoenix, AZ).
119. Moustakas, supra note 37, at 1184-89.
120. Id. at 1185.
121. KOUMANTOS, supra note 16, at 15.
An attempt is made to justify the illegal transfer of these goods from one
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pean Convention on offenses against cultural property rejected
defenses based on property law concepts of "good faith" pos-
session. 12 2
This school of thought, then, elevates concern for the cul-
tural aspect over concern for the property aspect of cultural
property. Its aim is to ensure that the cultural significance of
objects is respected even at the expense of long-standing prin-
ciples of property law. Members of this school might go so far
as to argue that property law principles are simply inapplica-
ble.
C. Zone of Agreement and Misconceptions of the Issues
For both the camp preferring the cultural aspect and the
camp preferring the property aspect, preservation is the princi-
pal concern in protection of cultural property. Preservation
figures among the three principles of "cultural international-
ism." Preservation motivates human rights arguments, or the
"cultural nationalist's" position, because destruction of or
damage to cultural property diminishes the strength of its affil-
iation and value to the culture. The proper question is, "What
are the essential qualities of cultural property that must be
protected?"
country to another by pleading that this property ought to be allowed to
move freely like commercial goods or even ideas. If cultural property be-
longs to the common heritage of mankind, why should we not have the satis-
faction of seeing the mosaics of Daphni displayed in Washington or the
treasures of Tutenkhamon displayed at Beijing or Lom6? "Free movement"
could give ostensible legitimacy to extremely strange and highly illegal re-
movals of property.
Nevertheless, it does not seem difficult to refute this argument based on
sophisms. Firstly, free movement, as recommended for goods within the
Common Market for example, presupposes legitimate acquisition both on
the part of the person making over the property and on the part of the per-
son purchasing it. When this condition is met, no objection can be raised to
the free movement of cultural property. Moreover, it increasingly takes the
form of international exchanges or loans between museums or other similar
institutions. What we would like to prevent is illegal cross-frontier move-
ment. And what is more, would it really be a two-way movement of goods
or rather a constant flow in the same direction, that is to say from the
poorest to the richest countries? Do you imagine that someone would steal
an artistic treasure from a museum in the United States to sell it in Bangla-
desh or Chad?
Id.
. 122. M. Evans, The Relevance Of Good Faith To The Trade In Cultural Property, in
ILPCP, supra note 16, at 121-23.
PROTECTING CULTURAL PROPERTY
The first misconception of the issue of protection of cul-
tural property is to ask instead, "Who owns cultural prop-
erty?" Focus on ownership tends to emphasize solely physical
preservation of items of cultural property as items of "prop-
erty." The second misconception of the cultural property
problem is to find the polarity between the two camps in their
supposed "national" or "international" orientation. The
question is not one of nationalism versus internationalism, but
one of the cultural aspect versus the property aspect. When
the "internationalist" school rejects as merely sentimental the
arguments for repatriation of cultural property based on cul-
tural affinity, it has missed an essential defining element of cul-
tural property.123 A holder of cultural property who fails to
appreciate its significance to the culture from which it was
taken, who does not understand its continuing relevance to the
identity of that culture, and who dismisses as mere sentimen-
tality the affinity between the object and the culture is an inap-
propriate custodian of the property.
The "internationalist" school of thought has also mis-
characterized the issue, or failed to recognize the implications
of the problem, when it suggests that source nations are al-
lowing cultural property to deteriorate rather than allowing
objects to find a better home abroad. The suggestion is that
such neglect of cultural property results either from a lack of
interest in or a lack of appreciation for the objects. Neither is
the case. Much of the problem is simply lack of financial re-
sources in source nations to address the problem. When the
"internationalists" do acknowledge this, their solution is for
such objects freely to flow out of the source nation. A more
appropriate solution, explored below, would be for developed
nations to provide assistance to source nations for the preser-
vation of cultural property.
In resolving the problems in protection of cultural prop-
erty, labels must be treated with suspicion. Professor Mer-
ryman uses the term "nationalism" as carrying negative impli-
cations of sentimental or greedy desire for possession of cul-
tural property while disregarding its value to the international
community or its physical safe-keeping. Presumably, Professor
Merryman is drawing on the negative implications of the ex-
123. See supra, notes 16-20 (defining cultural property).
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cesses of nationalism leading to armed conflict and attempts to
denigrate or dominate other cultures. Yet he also objects to
use of the power of cultural property to "strengthen tribal
identity" because it could "impede the process of nation build-
ing" in Africa.1 24 If "nationalism" is negative when applied to
cultural property questions, why is it positive when applied to
attempts to develop a sense of nation in a country with arbi-
trarily imposed borders? The term "internationalism" for Pro-
fessor Merryman carries positive connotations of distribution
of cultural property to enhance appreciation of the "common
heritage of mankind." It is possible that use of the term is little
more than a veil behind which to hide the self-interested reten-
tion of cultural property by acquisitive nations. Such nations
often cannot argue that their acquisition of cultural property
was legal, or even moral. '2 5 They must find a moral basis upon
which to justify their continued possession of such objects.
Preservation of the common cultural heritage of mankind is a
convenient and emotive basis for their claims. 126
The term "retention" must be viewed with similar suspi-
cion because it is used as a derogatory label by each camp for
the policies of the other. "Internationalists" contrast the term
"retention" with "protection" in the circumstances of coun-
tries rich in cultural treasures that cannot protect them, house
them, or even catalogue them, but refuse to allow duplicate
items to be taken abroad. 2 7 Proponents of the repatriation of
cultural property to source nations and peoples use "reten-
tion" as the derogatory term referring to the desire of acquisi-
tive nations to retain possession of cultural property over the
124. Merryman & Elsen, supra note 25, at 8.
125. See generally Merryman, supra note 7.
126. See id. at 1883. Merryman notes the greater emotional power of Greece's
claim to the "Elgin" Marbles, and the fact that arguments for Britain's retention of
the Marbles lack similar emotional appeal. Id.
It could, of course, be argued that using the terms "human rights law" and
"property law" is intended to give emotive impact to the arguments of one side over
the neutrality of the principles offered in support of the other. This is precisely what
Merryman rejected as "sentimentality." Certainly, a call for respect for "human
rights" has as much emotional appeal in present circumstances as a call for "interna-
tionalism." The difference, the author believes, between the designations of the op-
posing arguments offered here, lies in the accuracy of the characterization and the
reliance upon the respective sources of law cited by proponents of one position or
another.
127. LEVA, supra note 6, at 59.
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human rights claims of source nations.' 28
D. Proposals for Improving Protection of Cidtural Property
A number of authors have suggested ways to resolve dis-
putes over the possession and protection of cultural property.
These proposals fall roughly into four categories. First, some
authors call for improved dispute resolution mechanisms. Sec-
ond, several authors suggest standards or principles that
should be applied to resolve conflicts over possession or pro-
tection of cultural property. Third, a few authors suggest co-
operative solutions. Finally, there are calls for a more compre-
hensive framework of international protection. The orienta-
tion of most of these proposals, however, is still on pre-
eminence of the property aspect of cultural property.
1. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
Suggestions for improved dispute resolution of cultural
property controversies call for a tribunal to which parties could
bring their dispute for a swift, competent, and prestigious res-
olution. The International Court ofJustice is the logical forum
to come to mind, but its prestige is low and its jurisdiction is at
the option of the parties. 2 9 A second forum is a special tribu-
nal constituted specifically to address cultural property dis-
putes.. The tribunal should have subject matter jurisdiction
over disputes under the conventions and proceedings on other
bases. It should be composed of a large number of qualified
members formed into panels to address specific questions.
Procedures for access to the tribunal should depend in part on
whether bilateral agreements between the parties exist or not.
After written submissions and oral arguments, the tribunal
should render written opinions, including dissents and concur-
rences. 1
3 0
The U.S. Native American Graves Protection and Repatri-
ation Act includes dispute resolution provisions that might
provide a model for international application. Section 8 of the
Act establishes a seven-member review committee composed
128. Moustakas, supra note 37, at 1181 n.5.
129. Heidi K. Hubbard, Note, Separation of Powers Within the United Nations: A Re-
vised Role for the International Court of Justice, 38 STAN. L. REV. 165, 183 (1985).
130. Prunty, supra note 79, at 1167-82.
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of equal numbers of representatives from Native American or-
ganizations and the museum community, with a "tie-breaker"
representative chosen by the Secretary of the Interior from a
list of nominees acceptable to the two communities.' 3' The re-
view committee is to oversee the inventory process, consulta-
tions, and the repatriation process, including making specific
recommendations for disposition of items. Only this last pro-
posal in this group of suggestions attempts to balance the con-
cerns of those preferring the cultural aspect with those prefer-
ring the property aspect.
2. Codification of New Standards
The extremes of the arguments for codification of stan-
dards in resolving difficulties in the protection of cultural
property are the recognition of umbrella state ownership stat-
utes, 32 on the one hand, and application of property law "rea-
soned principles," such as repose, on the other, 3 3 thereby giv-
ing precedence to property aspect. The NAGPRA provides an
example of codification of presumptive ownership of cultural
property by the source peoples.' 34 Clearly, this solution pre-
fers the cultural aspect over the property aspect.
Another proposal is for application of the law of salvage to
cultural property. 1 5 Application of salvage law to cultural
property would work as follows: the source nation or people
would take title to cultural property held by another subject to
the payment of a salvage award to the present holder. To cal-
131. NAGPRA, supra note 90, § 3006 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
132. Moore, supra note 58, at 478.
133. Merryman, supra note 7, at 1911.
134. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text (providing example of pre-
sumptive ownership by some peoples).
135. Davis, supra note 38, at 658-63.
Deeply ingrained in British and American law, the law of salvage provides a
set of principles for rewarding an individual who, at great personal risk, res-
cues the property of another. Traditionally salvage law has applied exclu-
sively to the disposition of property rescued from navigable waters, includ-
ing ships, cargo, and goods washed out at sea. The word "salvage" is used
both to denote the property rescued and the award due the rescuer. The
doctrine of the salvor's right to be rewarded for his or her services resem-
bles the Roman law which grants the volunteer who preserves or improves
the property of another the right to compensation from the owner. The
roots of salvage law are traceable to Rhodian laws and the maritime codes of
ancient Mediterranean seaport cities.
Id. at 658-59 (citations omitted).
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culate the appropriate award, the court would consider the
personal risks, if any, taken by the present holder, the value of
the cultural property itself, the degree of danger facing the res-
cued property, and the present holder's subsequent conduct
(for example, concealment of the cultural property by the
holder would diminish the amount). Failure of the source na-
tion or peoples to post the salvage award would result in the
present holder taking title to the cultural property. Applica-
tion of salvage principles to similar situations involving cul-
tural property, it is argued, would produce an outcome that
would be both fair to the individuals involved and sensitive to
the broader public interest in cultural property.' 3 6 This solu-
tion gives some outlet for concern for the cultural aspect, but
only if it can be demonstrated in terms of the property aspect
by paying for the interest.
An arbitration panel or awards tribunal would have to be
constituted to determine the award if the parties were unable
to agree on the amount of the salvage award between them-
selves. Also, the salvage law proposal leaves open the question
of how source nations and peoples would learn of the salvage
of their cultural property in order to pursue a claim for its re-
turn. The proposal might also be seen as a license to huaqueros
to engage in covert discovery expeditions in order to collect
salvage awards.
Some other proposals suggest new restitutionary stan-
dards. The first of these proposals models an international
program for restitution of cultural property upon common law
principles. 3 7 A formulation of the doctrine to be applied
which appears in section 128 of the American Law Institute's
Restatement of Restitution states that "[a] person who has tor-
tiously obtained, retained, used or disposed of the chattels of
another, is under a duty of restitution to the other."' l3  The
136. Id. at 661-62.
137. See Sayre, supra note 9, at 857, 885.
138. RESTATEMENT OF RESTTrrIoN § 128 (1937); id. at 886. The proposer of
the new standards for restitution recognized that there were potential problems:
A number of problems are likely to arise in implementing such a scheme.
For example, who would be responsible for equitably compensating bona
fide purchasers of illegally exported cultural property? Also, how do we
convince the great art-importing nations to accept such a scheme when most
of them, including the United States, have never become a party to the 1970
UNESCO Convention?
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property orientation of such a proposal is apparent in describ-
ing the objects involved as "chattels."
A companion proposal to those establishing new stan-
dards for repatriation or restitution is for establishment of a
"World Cultural Heritage Fund," similar to the fund estab-
lished under Articles 15 through 18 of the UNESCO 1972.'
Unfortunately, the UNESCO 1972 fund has had a troubled his-
tory.
14 0
3. Cooperative Solutions
Cooperative solutions to cultural property problems
might be employed. In 1976, UNESCO suggested develop-
ment of a systematic exchange program.' 4' Source and acquis-
itive nations that encounter problems with the flow of cultural
property between them 'should consider reciprocal agree-
ments. 142 The United States first enacted legislation to control
the flow of cultural property at the behest of Central and South
American countries. 43 The most novel form of cooperative
solution is one of "joint custody." The de Young Museum in
San Francisco shares joint custody of murals from Teotihuacin
with the government of Mexico to resolve a tangled web of
ownership caused by conflict of U.S. and Mexican law.' 44
Id. (citations omitted).
139. See UNESCO, U.N. Doc. 17C/18,.(1972).
The monies raised by the fund would be distributed among needy. signatory
nations to help defray.the costs of protecting their national patrimonies, in-
cluding all service and restitutionary expenses that accrue under the 1970
Convention. The monies also could be used to alleviate some of the pres-
sure placed on developing nations by the world art market by allowing com-
pulsory purchase prices to more closely approximate those offered at auc-
tion.
Id. See also Sayre, supra note 9 at 887.
140. See Sayre, supra note 9 at 887.
141. UNESCO, RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE
OF CULTURAL PROPERTY, U.N. Doc. IV.B.8 (1976). The Preamble states: "Recalling
that cultural property constitutes a basic element of civilization and national culture,"
and "[c]onsidering that a systematic policy of exchanges among cultural institutions
... would ... lead to a better use of the international community's cultural heritage
which is the sum of all the national heritages." Id.
142. O'Keefe, supra note 69, at 368-69.
143. Law on Importation Of Pre-Columbian Monumental Or Architectural
Sculpture Or Murals, 19 U.S.C. § 2091 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see H.R. REP. No.
92-824, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. at 3 (Feb. 7, 1972) (setting forth stimulus for law).
144. LEVA, supra note 6, at 131-32.
PROTECTING CULTURAL PROPERTY
4. Tighter International Regulation
Finally, there are proposals for tighter international regu-
lation of the flow and ownership of cultural property. 45 A
tighter regulatory framework would have to pay greater atten-
tion to the relationship between ownership, export, and recov-
ery, and regulate issues of private international law. 146
IV. A NEW PROPOSAL
The premise of this paper is that proper protection re-
quires recognition of both the cultural and property aspects of
cultural property. Thus far, this paper demonstrates that both
aspects of cultural property are essential to its very nature.
Also, it shows that preservation is within the zone of agree-
ment between the opposing factions in the debate over protec-
tion of cultural property. Because preservation is the point of
agreement, the paper examines the meaning of acting in the
"best interest" of items of cultural property. The paper argues
that "best interest" involves both cultural and property as-
pects. The cultural aspect of objects is what gives rise to the
human rights element of the debate over cultural property, dis-
tinguishing the position of source nations from the property
concerns of acquisitive nations. Preoccupation with the prop-
erty aspect gives rise to disputes over who owns cultural prop-
erty. A resolution of the problem requires recognition of both
cultural and property aspects.' 47 It will also go far towards
eliminating subsidiary issues. It is time now to explore how
both cultural and property aspects might be given adequate
recognition in a regime for protection of cultural property.
Because the "best interest" of cultural property involves
both its cultural and property aspects, the solution has two fac-
ets. The first concerns preservation of the cultural aspect by
recognizing human rights principles. The second concerns
145. DICKE, The Instruments and the Agencies of the International Protection of Cultural
Property, in ILPCP, supra note 16, at 27-37.
146. O'Keefe, supra note 69, at 369.
147. See James A. R. Nafziger, Comments On The Relevance Of Law And Culture To
Cultural Property Law, 10 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 323 (1983) (making foray into exam-
ining relevance of culture to cultural property law). Nafziger's focus, however, was
the legal culture of nations involved in disputes, with the conclusion that it was rele-
vant to cultural property law in marshalling public opinion and evaluating the relative
significance of law. Id. at 326.
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physical preservation of cultural property, thereby protecting
its property aspect.
A. Reaffirmation of the Cultural Aspect of Cultural Property
Professor Merryman is right in asserting that a principled
basis must be found for resolution of cultural property contro-
versies, no less so for the cultural aspect of cultural property
than for the property aspect. Where might such principles be
found?
First, the sources of human rights arguments concerning
cultural property must be located. These may be found in the
international human rights declarations and covenants. 48
Next, particular principles must be extracted from the debate
according to which human rights issues can be resolved. A
source of such principles is the "Heard Museum Report"' 4 9
that preceded the drafting and passage of the NAGPRA.
The so-called Heard Museum Report was the Report of
the Panel for a National Dialogue on Museum/Native Ameri-
can Relations (the "Panel"). The Panel met four times during
1989 to foster dialogue aimed at formulating policy recom-
mendations for the protection and repatriation of Native
American cultural property held by museums and other insti-
tutions. 50 The Panel had equal representation of Native
American people with members of the museum community
and anthropologists, and involved ex-officio participation of
members of staffs of the Senate Select Committee On Indian
Affairs and House of Representatives.'
The dialogue was hailed by participants and observers as
demonstrating a sound approach to resolving cultural con-
flict,' 52 as representing a balance of conflicting interests,15 3
and as a "lesson in etiquette" in the respectful treatment of
people of diverse cultures.' 5 4 The Report is also a statement
of the human rights principles for respecting the cultural as-
148. See supra note 5 (listing human rights declarations and covenants).
149. See HEARD REPORT supra note 117.
150. HEARD REPORT, supra note 117, at 4, 10.
151. HEARD REPORT, supra note 117, at 7.
152. Hearing, supra note 114, at 594 (setting forth prepared submission by Peter
H. Welsh, Chief Curator/Director of Research, The Heard Museum).
153. 136 CONG. REc. H10,985-90 (1990) (statement of Rep. Richardson).
154. Hearing, supra note 114, at 46 (statement of Sen. Conrad).
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pect of cultural property. 55
The dialogue itself was premised on three principles. The
first of those principles was respect for the culture of source
nations and peoples.' 56 The second implicit principle was ap-
parent in the convening of the Panel itself. That principle is
one of consultation with source nations and peoples on the
treatment of remains and objects of cultural significance to
them. A third principle of cultural self-determination implicit
in the work of the Panel for a National Dialogue is one of
equality of the participants. 57
Substantive principles embodied in the report include,
first, the paramount principle of respect for the human rights
of source nations and peoples when a dispute over the disposi-
tion of cultural property arises. When cultural affiliation to the
objects has been shown, the wishes of the source nation or
group regarding the disposition of the materials must be fol-
lowed.15 8 Another substantive principle to address the human
rights attribute of cultural property is to guarantee that the
right is real and not chimerical. Standards of treatment of
items of cultural significance should be enforceable, and ap-
propriate agreements given the force of law.
The practical result of these principles is that the cultural
aspect of cultural property dictates its return to source nations
or peoples whenever a claim is made by competent representa-
tives with cultural affiliation to the objects. "Competent repre-
sentatives" and "sufficiently close cultural affiliation" require
some further definition. Here again, the NAGPRA provides
some guidance. "Cultural affiliation" is defined in Section 1(2)
of the Act as the "relationship of shared group identity which
155. HEARD REPORT, supra note 117, at 11-13; see A Model For Recognition Of
The Right To Cultural Self-Determination Of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 114
(examining principles postulated by HEARD REPORT as foundation for realization of
right to cultural self-determination).
156. Hearing, supra note 114, at 43. The Chairman of the Senate Select Commit-
tee, Senator Inouye observed that the issue of treatment of items of cultural signifi-
cance was not just one of return, but concern that "sacred objects to be treated with
respect." Id.
157. Hearing, supra note 114, at 368. It is this principle of cultural self-determi-
nation that the minority of the Panel felt had been violated in the recommendations
found in the Panel's report. Id. The minority view was that granting what amounted
to a veto to Native Americans simply reversed the presumption of dominance, per-
petuating the fundamental inequality of the decision-making process. Id.
158. HEARD REPORT, supra note 117, at 1.
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can be reasonably traced historically or prehistorically between
a present day [indigenous peoples organization] and an identi-
fiable earlier group."' 5 9 A competent representative would in-
clude the government of a source nation, as prescribed by in-
ternational law, but other representatives of source peoples
should also be accepted. For example, extrapolating from
NAGPRA's definition of "Indian tribe," a competent indige-
nous peoples organization would be one recognized- by the
government of the nation in which the indigenous people re-
side.' 6 ° The definition of "Native Hawaiian Organization" of-
fers further possible criteria. "Native Hawaiian Organization"
means "any organization which,... serves and represents the
interests of [indigenous peoples], . . . has as a primary and
stated purpose the provision of services to [indigenous peo-
ples], and ... has expertise in [indigenous peoples] affairs."' 16 1
Similarly, an indigenous person ("Native American" under the
Act) "means of, or relating to, a tribe, people, or culture that is
indigenous to the" source nation. 62
B. Protecting the Property Aspect of Cultural Property
Protection of the cultural aspect of cultural property re-
quires primarily recognition of a new set of principles, and per-
haps of values. Cultural significance, as an integral part of cul-
tural property, must be properly reflected in determining the
"best interest" of objects. Protecting the property attribute re-
quires more pragmatic measures. How can the physical safety
and integrity of objects of cultural significance be insured?
The answer to this second prong of the cultural property
problem lies in examination of success stories of international
law developing the means of international cooperation. De-
spite the differences in their views of the matter, acquisitive
nations and source nations agree on a zone of common con-
cern that involves the preservation of cultural property. Inter-
national protection of the global environment involved similar
recognition of a zone of common concern, and produced trea-
ties involving pragmatic solutions to difficult problems. The
159. NAGPRA, supra note 90, 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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solution required developed countries to recognize the aspira-
tions of lesser developed countries ("LDCs") for economic de-
velopment, and for LDCs to appreciate the threat continued
development posed to the environment. Protective measures
were beyond the means of most LDCs. One of the principal
means. of pragmatic solution to the problem of damage to the
environment involved .transfer of technology, with other tech-
nical and financial assistance, from economically developed
countries to LDCs.
To put the argument into its simplest terms, if developed
countries wish to impose their standards of protection upon
LDCs, and those standards are beyond the means of LDCs,
then developed nations must be prepared to provide the nec-
essary assistance to LDCs. The reward to developed countries
in the case of the treaties for protection of the global environ-
ment was the likelihood of a cleaner, safer environment. Ap-
plication of a similar solution in the case of cultural property,
this paper asserts, is likely to have much more certain, tangible,
and immediate benefits for acquisitive nations.
This section turns first to an examination of the problem
of and solutions for protection of the ozone layer.as a model
from environmental protection upon which to build a success-
ful scheme of technology transfer to protect cultural property.
Next, the extent to which an analogy between environmental
protection and protection of cultural property may be pursued
will be examined. The details of a proposal for transfer of
technology to protect cultural property will be presented in the
following section.
1. Learning From a Success Story of International Law:
Measures to Protect the Ozone Layer
The key factor in moving the world community toward a
cooperative solution to the problem of depletion of the ozone
layer was recognition of a "zone of common concern."'163
What were the ingredients to recognition of this "zone of com-
mon concern?" They were recognition of the immediacy and
163. See, e.g., Solomon et al., On the Depletion of Antarctic Ozone, 321 NATURE 755
(1986) (discussing extent of damage to ozone layer); John W. Kindt & Samuel P.
Menefee, The Vexing Problem Of Ozone Depletion in International Environmental Law and
Policy, 24 TEX. INT'L L. J. 261 (1989) (describing efforts of international community
to achieve agreement to address ozone problem).
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scope of the problem, the necessity of a global solution, and a
willingness to act in concert.
Recognition of the immediacy of the problem of ozone de-
pletion occurred in the mid 1980s when a hole was discovered
in the ozone layer over the Antarctic." The scope of the
problem became an issue of common concern shortly thereaf-
ter with the publication of the likely dire effects of depletion of
the ozone layer.' 65 Because problems with the ozone layer are
far-reaching, serious, and immediate, and because no single
nation could solve the problem, a global solution was re-
quired. 66 The will to act in concert came as a result of neces-
sity. 167
164. See, e.g., Solomon et al., supra note 163, at 755 (discussing extent of damage
to the ozone layer); Kindt & Menefee, supra note 163 (describing efforts of interna-
tional community to achieve agreement to address ozone problem).
165. Michael D. Lemonick, The Heat Is On: Chemical Wastes Spewed into the Air
Threaten the Earth's Climate, TiME, Oct. 19, 1987, at 59-60.
[Ilf the ozone layer diminishes over population areas-and there is some
evidence that it has begun to do so, although nowhere as dramatically as in
the Antarctic-the consequences could be dire. Ultraviolet radiation, a form
of light invisible to the human eye, causes sunburn and skin cancer; in addi-
tion, it has been linked to cataracts and weakening of the immune system.
Without ozone to screen out the ultraviolet, such ills will certainly increase.
The National Academy of Sciences estimates that a 1 % drop in ozone levels
could cause 10,000 more cases of skin cancer a year in the U.S. alone, a 2 %
increase."
Kindt & Menefee, supra note 163, at 265-67.
Theoretically, the complete destruction of the ozone layer would result in
the extinction of life on earth .... [A] 'decreasing' ozone layer would affect
life on earth .... A list of predictions follows including increases in cancers
and cataracts, alteration of plants and ecosystems, acid rain, degradation of
polymers used in industry, and increased 'greenhouse warming.'
Id.
166. Kindt & Menefee, supra note 163, at 268; Douglas Hunter Ogden, Com-
ment: The Montreal Protocol. Confronting The Threat To Earth 's Ozone Layer, 63 WASH. L.
REV. 997, 997-1001 (1988).
167. Links Between Global Climate Change, Other Environmental Problems
Examined, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1577 (Dec. 2, 1988). Ian M. Torrens of EPRI said in
a paper written for the conference:
[h]owever, this is an area where developed and developing countries have a
clearly discernible common interest in a world subject to global warming
.... If climatic warming is confirmed as a global issue, it will be clearly in
the industrialized countries' interest to provide developing countries with
the ability to minimize the growth of their contribution to atmospheric
CO[21.
Id. (emphasis added). Mr. Torres further suggested that "cooperation between gov-
ernment and industry on technology transfer, including channels of the multilateral
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The solution hit upon by the global community was to re-
duce CO 2 emissions from LDCs as well as from developed
countries. To assist LDCs with attaining control of CO 2 emis-
sions, developed countries agreed to transfers of control tech-
nology, expertise, and funding. After the Bonn Summit in
1985, the leading developed countries stated their intention to
bring shared research and resources, and transfer of technolo-
gies to bear upon resolution of environmental problems.'6 8
That pledge was reiterated at the Paris Summit in 1989.169
The United Nations Environment Program also recommended
transfer of technology to address problems of protection of the
global environment.170 More than recommendations for trans-
development banks and international or national development assistance organiza-
tions. Id
168. Canada-France-Federal Republic Of Germany-Italy-Japan-United King-
dom-United States-European Community: Documents From The Bonn Summit, 24
I.L.M. 878, 881 (1985). "[R]esearch and technology in major projects should be en-
hanced to make maximum use of our scientific potential. We recognize that such
projects require appropriately shared participation and responsibility as well as ade-
quate rules concerning access to the results achieved, the transfer of technology and
the use of technologies involved." Id.
169. Canada-European Communities-France-Federal Republic Of Germany-It-
aly-Japan-United Kingdom-United States: Declaration On Human Rights and Eco-
nomic Declaration From The Paris Summit, 28 I.L.M. 1292, 1297 (1989).
38) To help developing countries deal with past damage and to en-
courage them to take environmentally desirable action, economic incentives
may include the use of aid mechanisms and specific transfer of technology.
In special cases, ODA debt forgiveness and debt for nature swaps can play a
useful role in environmental protection.
We also emphasize the necessity to take into account the interests and
needs of developing countries in sustaining the growth of their economies
and the financial and technological requirements to meet environmental
challenges.
39) The depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer is alarming and
calls for prompt action.
We welcome the HELSINKI conclusions related, among other issues, to
the complete abandonment of the production and consumption of chloro-
fluorocarbons covered by the Montreal protocol as soon as possible and not
later than the end of the century. Specific attention must also be given to
those ozone-depleting substances not covered by the Montreal protocol.
We shall promote the development and use of suitable substitute substances
and technologies. More emphasis should be placed on projects that provide
alternatives to chloro-fluorocarbons.
Id.
170. United Nations Environment Programme: Governing Council Decision On
Global Climate Change, 28 I.L.M. 1330, 1334 (1989) [Reproduced U.N.E.P. Gov-
erning Council Decision 15/36, adopted May 25, 1989, at its Fifteenth Session] (rec-
ommending that "the institution of programmes and measures of assistance, includ-
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fer of technology resulted from the common concern for the
global environment. Treaties have been concluded between
LDCs or organizations of developing nations and organiza-
tions of developed nations mandating consultation on environ-
mental matters and transfer of technology. 17
The set of treaties, protocols, and declarations that em-
bodies the world community's concerted efforts to protect the
ozone layer begins with the Vienna Convention for the Protec-
tion of the Ozone Layer, March 22, 1985 (the "Vienna Ozone
Convention"). 72 The Vienna Ozone Convention established
the foundations of a program of exchanges of technology
among nations in Article 4.17 The process of building on that
foundation began with the Protocol on Substances That De-
plete The Ozone Layer ("Montreal Protocol"), on September
16, 1987.' 71 Article 10 on technical assistance established co-
operation in implementing technical assistance and an applica-
tion process whereby LDCs could seek technical assistance.
75
ing technology transfer, that will make it possible for developing countries to avoid
risk to global climate[.]"). Id.
171. See, e.g., Minutes of the Signing of the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention, 29
I.L.M. 809 (1990) (addressing environmental concerns).
172. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, March 22, 1985,
reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1529 (1985) [hereinafter Vienna Ozone Convention].
173. Vienna Ozone Convention, supra note 172, at 1530-31. Article 4, on Co-
operation in the legal, scientific, and technical fields, states:
1. The Parties shall facilitate and encourage the exchange of scientific,
technical, socio-economic, commercial and legal information relevant to this
Convention as further elaborated in annex II. ...
2. The Parties shall co-operate, consistent with their national laws,
regulations and practices and taking into account in particular the needs of
the developing countries, in promoting, directly or through competent in-
ternational bodies, the development and transfer of technology and knowl-
edge. Such co-operation shall be carried out particularly through:
(a) Facilitation of the acquisition of alternative technologyby other
Parties;
(b) Provision of information on alternative technologies and
equipment, and supply of special manuals or guides to them;
(c) The supply of necessary equipment and facilities for research
and systematic observations;
(d) Appropriate training of scientific and technical personnel.
Id.
174. Protocol on Substances That Deplete The Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
175. Montreal Protocol, supra note 174, at 1557. Article 10 states:
1. The Parties shall, in the context of the provisions of Article 4 of the
Convention, and taking into account in particular the needs of developing
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The dedication of the parties to the Vienna Ozone Convention
to transfer of technology to solve the ozone problem was reaf-
firmed in the Helsinki Declaration On The Protection Of The
Ozone Layer, on May 2, 1989.176 A more direct obligation to
transfer technology and assistance is a provision of the recent
amendment to the Montreal Protocol. 177
2. Apples and Oranges? Is There a Basis for Analogy
Between the Resolution of Environmental and
Cultural Property Problems?
The hazards of ozone depletion and loss or destruction of
cultural property are clearly not of a comparable degree. The
problem of protection of cultural property may, however, be of
the same immediacy and its scope appears to have been recog-
nized. It is also almost certainly beyond the capability of any
one nation to solve.
Recognition of the scope and immediacy of the problem
of protection of cultural property can be seen at an interna-
tional level in the promulgation of conventions during the past
countries, co-operate in promoting technical assistance to facilitate partici-
pation in and implementation of this Protocol.
2. Any Party or Signatory to this Protocol may submit a request to the
secretariat for technical assistance for the purpose of implementing or par-
ticipating in the Protocol.
Id.
176. Helsinki Declaration On The Protection Of The Ozone Layer, May 2, 1989,
reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1335 (1989).
The Governments and the European Communities represented at the First
Meetings of the Parties to the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol
... AGREE to facilitate the access of developing countries to relevant scien-
tific information, research results and training and to seek to develop appro-
priate funding mechanisms to facilitate the transfer of technology and re-
placement of equipment at minimum cost to developing countries.
Id. at 1335-36.
177. Montreal Protocol Parties: Adjustments And Amendments To The Mon-
treal Protocol On Substances that Deplete The Ozone Layer, 30 I.L.M. 541 (1991).
Article 10A states:
Transfer of technology
Each Party shall take every practicable step, consistent with the
programmes supported by the financial mechanism, to ensure:
(a) That the best available, environmentally safe substitutes and related
technologies are expeditiously transferred to Parties operating under para-
graph 1 of Article 5; and
(b) That the transfers referred to in subparagraph (a) occur under fair
and most favourable conditions.
Id. at 551.
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two decades. There has been increasing accession to those
treaties, including major acquisitive nations, during recent
years.' 78 Responsibility to protect cultural property and the
cultural heritage seems to be universally acknowledged. 79
Also, the threat to cultural property is receiving increasing
attention. Public outcry in support of legislation like the NAG-
PRA was stimulated by demonstrations calling attention to the
volume of Native American human remains on display in mu-
seums or shelved and ignored in the storerooms of the Smith-
sonian Institution.' 8" The deterioration of objects held in the
museums of source nations has also received media atten-
tion. '8'
As with the problem of depletion of the ozone layer, the
problem of protection of cultural property is beyond the com-
petence of any one nation to resolve. 82 Too many nations and
too many interests are involved, and the flow of cultural prop-
erty is too cosmopolitan for any one nation to control the
problems. Furthermore, the problem of cultural property is
amenable to solution by means similar to those employed to
protect the ozone layer, as shall be explained below.
There is a tension between two interests in both the ozone
and cultural property problems. With the problem of ozone
178. Bator, supra note 25, at 282-84.
179. Joseph L. Sax, Heritage Preservation As A Public Duty: The Abbi Grigoire and the
Origins of an Idea, 88 MIcH. L. REV. 1142 (1990). "[T]here is no deep-rooted theory
or philosophy of preservation. The idea that there is some collective obligation to
identify and protect cultural artifacts is quite modern." Id. at 1143 (citation omitted).
180. Hearing, supra note 114, at 55 (statement of Norbert Hill, Executive Direc-
tor, American Indian Science and Engineering Society, Boulder, Colo.). In the
1930s, the remains of over 800 Koniag people were excavated from a cemetery still in
use under the aegis of the Smithsonian Institution. Id. The Smithsonian Institution
still retained those remains on the eve of passage of the legislation of interest here.
Museum holdings of Native American remains and objects of cultural significance are
substantial. Id. The Field Museum of Natural History in Chicago holds approxi-
mately 1,200 human remains of Native Americans and about 135,000 archaeological
objects from all over the United States. Id. at 45 (statement of Willard Boyd, Presi-
dent of the Field Museum, Chicago, Ill.). Significant numbers of remains are housed
in other museums around the country. Id. at 49, 186 (statement of Edward Lone
Fight, on behalf of the National Congress of American Indians, Washington, D.C.;
prepared statement of Walter Echo-Hawk, Native American Rights Fund, Boulder,
Colo.).
181. Edward Schumacher, Peru's Antiquities Crumbling in Museums, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 15, 1983, at 14.
182. William D. Rogers, Book Review: The International Trade in Art by Paul M.
Bator, 79 AM.J. INT'L L. 847, 847 (1985).
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depletion, the tension is between the desire, sometimes stated
as a right, of LDCs to continue economic development and the
need for a safe environment championed by the developed na-
tions. With cultural property, the tension is between protec-
tion of the cultural aspect of cultural property, articulated in
terms of human rights law, raised by the source nations (often
LDCs) and concern for the property aspect, articulated in
terms of property law principles, touted by the acquisitive na-
tions (usually highly developed economically). In each case, it
is a resource of the LDCs that is subject to exploitation and
technology from the developed nations that is necessary to re-
solve the problem.
C. What to Transfer and How?
This section considers the goals and areas of emphasis of a
program of technology transfer to protect the property aspect
of cultural property. The goal is physical safety of objects.
The question of what to transfer and through what mechanism
to achieve that goal may again be answered by recourse to the
model of the ozone conventions and related declarations.
1. Funding
The Parties to the Montreal Protocol established the In-
terim Multilateral Fund, which will operate for three years be-
ginning January 1, 1991, to fulfill the obligations of transfer of
technology in the Protocol. The fund will assist with financing
LDC's supply of substitutes for ozone-depleting chemicals, use
of substitutes (including plant conversions), and costs of modi-
fication or replacement of equipment. s3
The first thing to be transferred by acquisitive nations to
source nations to assist in protecting cultural property, then, is
funding. The proposal for funding above, 184 focused on funds
to assist in prosecuting claims for repatriation of cultural prop-
183. Rene Bowser, History of the Montreal Protocol's Ozone Fund, 14 Int'l Envtl. Rep.
Current Rep. (BNA) 636 (Nov. 20, 1991). The Noordwijk Declaration calls for fund-
ing of technology transfer to combat ozone depletion aim primarily at operating ex-
penses. See The Noordwijk Declaration Of November 7, 1989, On Atmospheric Pol-
lution And Climatic Change, 12 Int'l Envtl. Rep. Current Rep. (BNA) 624 (Dec. 13,
1989).
184. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing World Culture Heri-
tage Fund).
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erty. The present proposal is for funding to protect the physi-
cal safety of cultural property as well. The ozone fund is
designed to cover on-site costs of improving protective condi-
tions. Similarly, the funding for cultural property protection
would be available for (1) improvement of storage, examina-
tion, educational, and display facilities, and (2) personnel
needs, both for education of staff and for hiring. The funds
required for these purposes are likely to be smaller than the
funds necessary for acquisition of objects as part of a program
of repatriation by purchase or for expenses of pursuing legal
claims for repatriation. 18 5
2. Expertise
In addition to transferring funds, protecting cultural prop-
erty calls for transfer of expertise. This should involve direct
exchange of museum personnel, archaeologists, anthropolo-
gists, preservation specialists, or museum environment special-
ists. These visiting experts would assist source nations with
planning or pursuing programs of cultural property protec-
tion. Such protection would involve development of museum
facilities, educational programs, preservation programs, cata-
loguing of objects, or competent discovery, investigation, and
removal of cultural property from historic sites.'
i 6
The flow of expertise should not be one way. Experts in
source nations might well be able to provide insights in the
tasks of identifying and explaining the cultural significance of
objects in the collections of museums in acquisitive nations.
Educational facilities of museums and academic institutions in
the acquisitive nations should also be at the disposal of experts
visiting from source countries so that the institution as well as
the visitor may be enriched.
185. LEVA, supra note 6, at 60-62. The purchase prices of antiquities are out of
reach of many LDCs, as is the cost of renovating facilities. Id. Relatively small
amounts of money would go a long way toward renovation of facilities to prevent
deterioration of cultural property in storage or on display, train staff, or fund staff
positions at a source nation's or peoples' museum when the entire budget for Peru's
national museum was only U.S. $200,000 in 1983. Id. That budget paid the salary of
the museum's 89 staff members, including guards and secretaries. At that time, the
museum had only one climate-controlled room, but was seeking U.S. $40 million to
build a new facility. Id.
186. Id. Peru was unable to keep up with the cataloguing and examination of
antiquities already in storage at the national museum. Id.
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3. Technology
The heart of a program of cooperative protection of cul-
tural property, however, would be the transfer of preservative
technology. Transfer of technology has had a successful but
controversial history in addressing the ozone problem. The
necessity of transferring technology to protect the ozone layer,
and the will to do so, were recognized in the Helsinki Declara-
tion and other statements of developed countries. The tech-
nology that must be transferred to protect cultural property is
primarily relatively low-technology, climate-control equipment
to protect objects in storage or on display. 8 7 Even in the case
of protection of the Parthenon from environmental damage,
the technology required was not sophisticated. 8 " If such basic
preservative technology and adequate funding for staff and fa-
cilities were provided, the whole argument that source nations
were inappropriate custodians of their own cultural property
would collapse.
4. The Quid Pro Quo
What is to motivate acquisitive nations to become involved
in transfer of resources, expertise, and technology to assist
source nations in becoming better custodians of their own cul-
tural property? Quite simply, it is the opportunity to retain
access to and distribution of cultural property for the world
community. Access and distribution are key principles of "cul-
tural internationalism."' 8 9 By providing needed assistance to
source nations, acquisitive nations would be in a position to
negotiate access to and distribution of cultural property in the
form of exchanges, long-term loans, cooperative exhibitions,
and cooperative scholarship.
The other principles of "cultural internationalism" would
also be served. The goal of the program of transferring funds,
expertise, and technology, of course, is preservation. Integrity
of the cultural property would also be achieved with such a
program as collections of items of cultural property could be
maintained instead of being broken up either by deterioration,
187. Id. at 61.
188. Id.
189. See supra, notes 97-107 and accompanying text (discussing "cultural inter-
nationalism").
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forced or covert sale of items, or the necessity of choosing
which among many related objects can be saved.
5. The Mechanism of Transfer
Again, as was demonstrated by the ozone problem, the
mechanism of transfer must be acceptable to donors and recip-
ients. 190 There are several competent international agencies
available to handle transfer of funds and technology for the
protection of cultural property. They include the International
Monetary Fund (the "IMF"), UNESCO, the Agency for Cul-
tural and Technical Co-operation (the "ACCT"), and the In-
ternational Center for the Study of the Preservation and the
Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM). 19' Also in place
are the fund and administrative organs of the "World Heritage
Fund" and the fund established under UNESCO 1970.
Reorientation or establishment of departments charged
with facilitating exchange agreements within one of these com-
petent organizations would be a relatively simple matter. The
use of the international preservation funds named above is
probably preferable as they are already identified with cultural
property protection.
The next question considers who is to be the source of
funds, expertise, and technology? There is a willingness on
the part of governments to become involved in such a pro-
gram, as can be seen by the increasing acceptance of the cul-
tural property treaties. However, much of the cultural prop-
erty that source nations would wish to repatriate is held in col-
lections and museums not directly controlled by the
government of acquisitive nations. A program of bilateral ex-
changes between individual institutions might prove produc-
tive, for example the "joint custody" of murals from Teotihua-
cin by the de Young Museum in San Francisco with the gov-
ernment of Mexico.' 92 Current holders and claimants of
cultural property could be brought together under the aegis of
190. See Bowser, supra note 183, at 636-40. "The largest and most powerful
developing countries made clear that they would not sign the agreement until an
adequate financial mechanism was established to pay for the added cost of substitutes
for ozone-depleting substances." Id.
191. Id.; see also Dicke, in ILPCP, supra note 16, at 29 (listing agencies concerned
with cultural property).
192. LEVA, supra note 6, at 131-32.
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an administering agency to negotiate cooperative arrange-
ments involving repatriation of lost objects, loans and ex-
changes of items of mutual interest, and transfer of expertise
and preservative technology. In this way, a dialogue could be
opened between the polar positions that would ultimately lead
to resolution of the disputes in the protection of cultural prop-
erty. Increased respect for the cultural aspect of cultural prop-
erty forwarded by source nations and peoples would be
achieved by cooperation in repatriation and preservation. The
goal of preservation based on the property aspect of cultural
property would also be achieved.
V. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPOSAL: CAN IT WORK?
The assessment of any proposal to resolve disputes over
the protection of cultural property must be based on three cri-
teria. The first criterion is whether or not the proposed solu-
tion is practicable. The second is whether or not the proposed
solution does what it sets out to do. The final criterion is
whether or not the proposed solution will be acceptable to the
parties involved. The present proposal passes all three of
these criteria.
A. Assessment of the Proposal for Protecting the Cultural Aspect of
Cultural Property
The proposal for protecting the cultural aspect of cultural
property was to reaffirm the human rights aspect of the prob-
lem. The practical result of this reaffirmation is return of cul-
tural property to source nations or peoples whenever a claim is
made by competent representatives with cultural affiliation to
the objects in question.
Is it workable or acceptable to mandate repatriation of cul-
tural property as a guiding principle? There is a ready exam-
ple to demonstrate that the answer to this question is yes. The
United States NAGPRA 9 3 is that example. NAGPRA man-
dated the repatriation of a broad category of cultural property,
human remains and objects of cultural significance, to source
peoples. The repatriation was to be undertaken by all muse-
ums receiving federal funds, following an inventory of such
193. See supra, notes 90-93, 159-62 (discussing provisions of NAGPRA).
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cultural property, and assessment of the cultural affiliation of
each object. Both the inventory, and the assessment of cul-
tural affiliation to determine the proper recipient of repatria-
tion were to be carried out in cooperation with the source peo-
ples. Funds were to be made available to assist both source
peoples in pursuing claims, and to museums to conduct the
inventories, and a dispute resolution panel was established.
The Act was passed by a substantial majority of both
houses of the U.S. Congress. Its promulgation followed exten-
sive consultation between the interested parties. These facts
suggest that repatriation of cultural property to source peoples
is acceptable to a wide spectrum of interests in the largest ac-
quisitive market in the world. Furthermore, the process of
consultation addressed the interests of both source and acquis-
itive parties to ensure that the final provisions of the act were
workable, and that they achieved the goals of protection and
repatriation of cultural property. I would suggest that if there
is the willingness to pursue such a program in the United
States, and it has had results satisfying to both source peoples
and current holders of cultural property, then acceptance of
the same principles on a global scale should meet with similar
success.
B. Assessment of the Proposal to Protect the Property Aspect of
Cultural Property
In assessing the proposal to protect the property aspect of
cultural property in addition to the criteria of assessment ap-
plied above there is an additional question to be asked. That
question, discussed last in this section, is whether or not the
proposals for transfer of funds, expertise, and technology to
protect cultural property can avoid some of the pitfalls en-
countered in transfer programs to protect the environment.
1. Can It Work?
The short answer to this question is that transfers of fund-
ing, expertise, and technology have already happened. Fur-
thermore, these transfers have had a beneficial impact on the
problem they were designed to address. It was provisions for
such transfers that had a substantial influence on the participa-
tion of LDCs in programs for protection of the global environ-
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ment. The global will to solve the problem was the impetus
behind acceptance of such provisions by developed countries.
The need for measures to protect the global environment
and the need to assist LDCs to that end were recognized by
developed countries. 94 Initially, the U.S. government feared
the establishment of a precedent of transfer of funds and tech-
nology to address global problems. However, the public sup-
port for such measures led to a turn-around in U.S. policy.'95
The United States has now become one of the principal propo-
nents of technology transfer to protect the environment.' 9 6
Other industrialized countries, such as Japan, have also ac-
cepted transfer of technology and funding as appropriate
means of addressing problems of global concern. 97
Transfer of technology has been a valuable incentive to
obtain the involvement of LDCs in protection programs of
global concern. The Montreal Protocol assured LDCs that de-
veloped countries would provide transfer of technologies and
technical assistance to assist them in controlling the ozone
problem.' 8 The lack of clear provisions for transfer of tech-
194. Bowser, supra note 183, at 636-40.
195. Id.; see also U.S. to Finance Research on Global Warming, UPI, Feb. 27, 1992
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. "Stung by criticism of its opposition to
limiting carbon dioxide emissions, the United States offered Thursday to pay for en-
vironmental research studies in the developing countries and give them the technol-
ogy to combat global warming." Id.
196. Soviet Environmental Officials Advise Complete Chlorofluorocarbon Phase-Out, 13
Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 592 (July 28, 1989):
Technology Transfer
The United States also considers transfer of CFC substitute technology
a key part of addressing the ozone depletion problem, according to Eileen
Claussen, director of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Office of
Atmospheric and Indoor Air Programs. Claussen said it will be difficult to
overcome the objections developing countries have to being told they can-
not use CFCs.
Industrialized nations need to determine how to fill the CFC needs of
developing countries, she said. She added, however, that first it has to be
determined exactly how much and what kinds of technology they need, as
well as how much funding they must have to begin using the technology.
Id.
197. Highlights, 14 Int'l Envtl. Rep. Current Rep. (BNA) 433 (Aug. 14, 1991).
"POLLUTION CONTROL TECHNOLOGY will be transferred by Japan to other
Asian countries, the Environment Agency announces. As a first step, the agency will
examine the technology needs of China, Thailand, and Indonesia, and then transfer
relevant Japanese technologies to those countries for as long as 20 years." Id.
198. Montreal Protocol, supra note 174, art. 10, 26 I.L.M. at 1557.
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nology and funding made LDCs slow to accede to the Proto-
col. Without such assistance, LDCs could do little to address
the ozone problem. 199 When the United States reversed its
position on technology transfer, issuing a statement support-
ing the creation of a CFC fund, operated and administered by
the World Bank, the announcement undoubtedly spurred the
unanimous decision of the parties to the Montreal Protocol, on
June 29, 1990, to establish the Interim Multilateral Fund to fi-
nance technology transfer to developing nations. The estab-
lishment of a fund for technology transfer also was an incen-
tive to the Indian and Chinese environment ministers to rec-
ommend ratification to their respective governments. 0° Such
"selected incentives" are important to obtain the participation
of the least enthusiastic relevant parties. The selective incen-
tives commonly used are access to funding, access to re-
sources, access to markets, and access to technology.20 '
There is a direct precedent for transfer of funds, exper-
tise, and technology in the protection of cultural property.
UNESCO 1972 provides, in Articles 13 and 19, for financial
assistance from the "World Heritage Fund" to support conser-
vation measures for national sites included in a "world heri-
tage list" if states maintain these sites at agreed-upon stan-
dards of protection. 0 2 The fund is administered by the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), and now has an annual budget of $2.2 million fi-
nanced by both mandatory and voluntary contributions and
split nearly evenly between projects for cultural and natural
heritage sites. 20 3 With 111 member states, UNESCO 1972 is
the most widely accepted "environmental treaty" and cultural
property treaty today.20 4
The incentive that is provided to developed nations to
provide technology, funds, and other assistance to LDCs in the
environmental area is usually access to natural resources.20 5
199. Bowser, supra note 183, at 636-40.
200. Id.
201. Peter H. Sand, Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance, 18 B.C.
ENVrL. AFF. L. REV. 213, 221 (1991).
202. UNESCO 1972, supra note 51, art. 13, 1927 U.S.T. at 44, 1037 U.N.T.S. at
155,.
203. Sand, supra note 201, at 221-22.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 222.
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As mentioned above, the incentive for acquisitive nations to
transfer to source nations technology and funds to protect cul-
tural property is also access to the resources of the source na-
tion, in this case cultural property, archaeological sites and
monuments.
Will transfer of funds, technology, and expertise to source
nations result in the physical protection of cultural property?
It is difficult to see why improving the facilities to preserve and
study cultural property in the source nations should not result
in as high a degree of preservation as could be achieved in mu-
seums and collections in acquisitive nations. The only signifi-
cant difference between the two places is the ayailability of re-
sources to address the problem. If the resources are made
available to source nations, then the goal of preservation
should be met. Indeed, because cultural property is still con-
centrated in source nations, on-site preservation should result
in broader protection of cultural property rather than protec-
tion of a few selected pieces that have been exported.
2. Avoiding the Pitfalls of Transfer of Technology in
Environmental Protection
Transfer of technology and funds to protect the environ-
ment has remained a contentious issue.2°6 The central prob-
lem is the concern of developed countries that they will simply
be "giving away" their technological achievements.2 0 7 Similar
206. See, e.g., No Timetable Set For C0 2 Reductions, 'Precautionary Principle' Upheld, 21
Env't Rep. 267 (BNA) (May 25, 1990) (noting U.S.'s continued objection to transfer
of technology and funds to control CFCs as dangerous precedent for expectations
that developed countries will continue to pay).
207. J. T. Nguyen, UN-Environment, UPI, Mar. 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File.
The issue of development and environment has transformed the relation-
ship between the Northern and Southern hemispheres into a battleground
between rich and poor, each blaming the other for the deteriorating envi-
ronment.
In advance of the Rio dejaneiro summit, business communities, partic-
ularly those in the United States, have been up in arms against an onslaught
of Third World demands on sharing high-technology equipment if the
meetings bring about strict rules against greenhouse gas emissions.
Industrialized countries want the United Nations to protect patents on use of their
technology, particularly in industrial development.
Id. (emphasis added).
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concerns should not waylay efforts to transfer technology and
funds to source nations to protect cultural property.
The first reason that the opposition to transfer of technol-
ogy to protect cultural property should not arise is the differ-
ence between the technology sought by source nations and
that sought by LDCs to address environmental problems. The
technology necessary to protect cultural property is largely cli-
mate-control devices in common usage in the museums, and
even office buildings, of developed countries. There is little
unique technology involved, and consequently little prospect
of loss of significant royalties from new "high-tech" develop-
ments, as is the case with environmental protection technol-
ogy.
When the concern is over transfer of expertise, there are
no significant "trade secrets" to be lost in the protection of
cultural property. Most of the expertise required can be
gained by training at museums and universities in developed
countries. These facilities already exist. What is required is
funding to bring people from source nations into these institu-
tions for training, or to provide for exchanges of experts be-
tween source and acquisitive nations. This should be part of
the enrichment of the academic world that is the goal of uni-
versity programs of cultural diversity.
Finally, while the results of cooperation to protect the en-
vironment are often a speculative improvement in environ-
mental conditions, the results of transfers of funds and tech-
nology to protect cultural property are immediate and obvious.
The impact of ozone depletion lies years ahead, and so too
does the impact of efforts to control the problem. The im-
provement in preservative conditions that could be wrought by
providing a Peruvian museum with adequate climate control
devices and assistance with funding and training of adequate
staff would be immediate. So too, the benefits of cooperation
in exchange of cultural property would be immediate. Instead
of retaining access to those pieces of cultural property in its
current collection, a museum in an acquisitive nation that ne-
gotiates an exchange program with a museum in a source na-
tion as part of a repatriation agreement would gain access to a
much wider range of the wealth of cultural property in the
source nation.
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C. Avoiding the Worst Controversies in Protection of
Cultural Property
Perhaps the greatest benefit to be gained by adoption of
the proposals in this paper is the avoidance of the worst con-
troversies in protection of cultural property. If the principle of
repatriation is established on human rights grounds, then not
only will the cultural aspect of cultural property be vindicated,
but a new spirit of cooperation and respect between source
and acquisitive nations could be achieved. That certainly has
been the result of the Heard Dialogue and the NAGPRA. For-
mer holders of cultural property are able to draw upon the re-
sources of Native Americans in identifying the cultural affilia-
tion of objects and gaining access to objects of continuing in-
terest to both communities. Once the fear of dispossession has
been removed, the interest in cultural understanding and re-
spect stated by both source and acquisitive communities can be
fostered.
The assertion of the preeminence of the property aspect
over the cultural aspect, the claim of "cultural international-
ism" over "cultural nationalism," has been a divisive element
blocking the common goal of preservation of cultural prop-
erty. It is time to end the division and take steps toward the
common goal.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has distinguished between the cultural and
property aspects of cultural property, and identified each as an
essential element in the nature of cultural property. The di-
chotomous nature of cultural property has not been ade-
quately reflected in either the definition of cultural property or
efforts to protect it. Instead, the international legal regime has
focused on the property aspect of cultural property by asking
the question, who owns cultural property? The principal dis-
pute in resolving cultural property issues has been how best to
preserve cultural property to protect the "best interest" of cul-
tural property. Two schools of thought have arisen, each ele-
vating one aspect of cultural property over the other. One
school of thought, preferring the property aspect, attempts to
resolve conflicts on the basis of property law principles. It is
primarily concerned with physical safety of objects. The other
1992-1993] 1091
1092 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 16:1033
school of thought, preferring the cultural aspect, attempts to
resolve conflicts on the basis of human rights principles. It is
primarily concerned with preserving the cultural significance
and affinity of objects to specific peoples. Preservation lies
within the zone of agreement between the two schools of
thought on protection of cultural property, but it means differ-
ent things to the two schools.
An appropriate resolution of disputes over preservation
must take into account both the cultural and property aspects
of cultural property. Objects should not be consigned to dete-
rioration out of neglect or lack of resources unless that deteri-
oration is a part of the cultural function of the objects, as it is
with the Zuni war gods. Objects of cultural significance must
be treated with respect for that cultural significance. A holder
who rejects as sentimental the role an object plays in the cul-
tural identity of a group is not a fit custodian for that object.
. The best resolution of the controversies over protection of
cultural property is in two parts. First, the cultural aspect of
the objects must be affirmed. In theoretical terms, affirmation
of the cultural aspect means recognizing human rights princi-
ples for disposition of cultural property. In practical terms, the
cultural aspect of cultural property can best be preserved by
repatriating it to source nations and peoples. Holders of cul-
tural property outside of the source nation or peoples should
retain possession only with the consultation and consent of the
source. Source nations and peoples would likely accede to
desires of outsiders to hold cultural property in cases where
they perceive that interests such as preservation, developing
cultural education, understanding, and respect can be attained
in that way.
The property aspect of cultural property, that which re-
quires its physical preservation, can best be served by develop-
ing a program of transfer of funding, technology, and exper-
tise. The model for such transfers is to be found in the inter-
national programs for environmental protection. Both
environmental protection and protection of cultural property
involve common interest of the nations and peoples of the
world, involve problems of broad scope, and are beyond the
capability of individual nations, peoples, or groups to resolve.
Programs of transfers have been accepted, proven workable,
and achieved the goal of improving the environment.
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Similarly, a comprehensive program of transfers between
acquisitive nations and source nations, and between individual
peoples, organizations, and institutions, should be established.
The goal of the program would be to transfer funding to pur-
sue repatriation claims, but more immediately to enhance facil-
ities and staff in source nations to protect cultural property. It
would also involve exchange of experts and cooperation in the
training of experts and sharing of information discovered from
cultural property. The technology to be transferred under
such a program is primarily climate-control equipment, readily
available, inexpensive (compared to environmental protection
equipment), and unlikely to give rise to concerns of transfer-
ring high-tech achievements to LDCs.
The benefits of pursuing the proposed solution to cultural
property issues are immediate. Both the cultural and property
aspects of the objects will be respected. Cultural property will
be preserved, its integrity maintained, and distribution and ac-
cess to cultural property by acquisitive nations would likely im-
prove and broaden. The divisive debate over elevation of
either the property aspect or the cultural aspect over the other,
often cloaked in uncomfortable guises as "cultural internation-
alism" and "cultural nationalism," must come to an end. The
problem of protection of cultural property is one of common
concern among the peoples of the world. A cooperative solu-
tion, balancing concern for both the cultural and property as-
pects, is most appropriate.
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